1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
3	<b>ALMA SIMONET, ET AL,</b> * CV. 06-01230 (GAG) * COA 09-2434
4	Plaintiffs, *
5	* San Juan, Puerto Rico vs.
c	* 27 July 2009 SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP *
6	SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP., * d/b/a/ GLAXOSMITHKLINE PUERTO * 4:00 p.m.
7	RICO, INC., ET AL,
8	*
0	Defendants. *
9	*
10	
11	FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE <b>GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ</b> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
13	
14	APPEARANCES
	COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
15	JOHN NEVARES, ESQ. CAMILO SALAS, ESQ.
16	CARLOS RAMIREZ, ESQ.
17	JEFF WEINSTEIN (PHV), ESQ. HERBERT BROWN, ESQ.
18	FRANK INSERNI, ESQ. MICHELLE BONILLA, SOTOMAYOR, ESQ.
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20	
21	COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: Now let's call the Simonet case.
3	THE CLERK: In civil case 06-1230.
4	Proceedings: Final fairness hearing. Plaintiffs of
5	record shall identify themselves for the Court.
6	MR. NEVARES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is
7	John Nevares and I represent class counsel together with
8	Mr. Camilo Salas and Mr. Brian Strange.
9	MR. BARRIOS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Rossell
10	Barrios representing defendants.
11	MR. HEROLD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Fred Herold,
12	also representing the defendants.
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	MR. WEINSTEIN: Your Honor, Jeff Weinstein representing
15	Clay Bain, objector, and you have allowed me to be admitted pro
16	hac. Thank you. And I am here with local cocounsel, Mr.
17	Herbert Brown.
18	MS. BONILLA: Good afternoon, Michelle Bonilla
19	Sotomayor in representation of objectors, William and Catherine
20	McWhorter and Susan Colvin.
21	THE COURT: Mr. Inserni.
22	MR. INSERNI: Frank Inserni. I am pro hac vice for the
23	estate of Keith Allen and one of the objectors to the
24	settlement.
25	THE COURT: You are not pro hac vice.

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MR. INSERNI: I am sorry. I am local counsel. Pro hac vice counsel, Mr. John Spence.

THE COURT: Mr. Spence is not here.

MR. WILKINSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is Wells Wilkinson. I am an attorney here on behalf of objector Diane M. Fox and I am here with local counsel, Raul Mariani.

MR. MARIANI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At least in Mr. Mariani's and in Mr. Brown's case, if you want to stay here, of course, you are not going to be doing the argument, you are welcome to stay. I know Mr. Mariani wants to be excused. Of course, you are welcomed. If you want to participate you may participate, but I have no problem with having pro hac vice counsel, by themselves, argue the case.

What we will begin by doing is, and again, I intend to hear everybody. I will be recessing around 3:30 or 4:00 at the latest. If we need to continue we will continue tomorrow. Everybody will be heard. There have been a lot of motions. I think everything has been ruled upon. There are a couple in abeyance pending. What I would propose then is that, first, counsel for plaintiffs go first. Then counsel for GlaxoSmithKline go next and then we will have the objectors counsel go next. I know there have been some objections filed but counsel are not here or it is impossible for them to come. My inclination is to consider them along with all other

objections. And that's my inclination, but I can hear from counsel before I make a final ruling as to that.

Mr. Strange, please go ahead.

MR. STRANGE: Thank you, Your Honor, and good afternoon. Brian Strange for the plaintiff class. If it is acceptable to the Court I would propose that I would address the issue of the final fairness of the settlement and the objections, as they pertain to the settlement; and Mr. Nevares will address the issue of attorney's fees and the objections, as they pertain to the attorney's fees.

Your Honor, this case began in 2004 in California. As Your Honor is aware, my firm along with two other firms initiated the case in 2004 in California.

THE COURT: In state court, correct?

MR. STRANGE: In state court. It was a very vigorous litigation. There were nine motions to dismiss, including two motions for judgments on the pleadings regarding preemption.

There was four amended complaints. There were writs of mandate to the Court of Appeals. There were 11 status conferences over the five years. There were tens of thousands of documents produced by GlaxoSmithKline. There was a discovery referee appointed who addressed numerous discovery motions to compel. There was numerous witness interviews that we conducted with respect to employees and former employees at the plant here in Puerto Rico. There were expert witnesses that we retained,

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formerly employed by the FDA, regarding the status of the production of the drug called Paxil here in Puerto Rico.

The essence of our case, Your Honor, and the reason there were so many substantive motions to dismiss, which in California state court we call demurrers, is because we contended, the plaintiffs, that we were entitled to seek only economic injury for the purchases of defective Paxil. Our case did not concern personal injuries. So the big issue that GlaxoSmithKline raised is if you received a pill you have to prove that it didn't work or how have you been injured.

And so there was a big causation issue and a big damage issue. And, ultimately, we focused, Your Honor, on receiving split pills. Our contention was that because of the defects in manufacturing the pills split apart.

So we began to do and did extensive analysis in the case about how many -- what is the extent of damages; how many split pills were there. And we still, mind you, have the problem of did our plaintiffs receive a split pill. And, if so, can they produce it?

So the legal question of whether there was damages, and then the factual issue of how many damages — how much of the pills were manufactured with the split-pill problem became an issue. GSK contended, based on documents in their files, that only eight parts in a million of these Paxil pills had the problem with splitting apart. We both agreed that there were

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approximately 700 million Paxil pills produced and sold during the class period. And our evidence was, and our best argument was approximately two percent of all the pills they produced have the problem with splitting apart.

So the damages, Your Honor, range from 8 parts to a million to this two percent or approximately 50,000 to the outside of 42 million, if we prevailed on our theory of damages and through class certification.

And in our case, by the way, we filed two extensive motions for class certification, which have not been ruled upon, but include all the affidavits from our experts and our physicians on class certification. The reason there were two, Your Honor, is that we did add a third party payor, Universal Care, into the case and then filed an additional class certification on that issue.

So, when ultimately we began discussing settlement with SmithKline we, the plaintiffs, combined our case with the Simonet case down here so we could come to some kind global resolution if possible. And we came to settlement discussions that lasted individually and collectively over a year with SmithKline counsel. And SmithKline's position, not surprising,l,y was that our case wasn't worth much. As the plaintiffs, we obviously vigorously disputed that. And after extensive negotiations we were able to convince SmithKline to settle for 28 million dollars; up to 28 million dollars, which,

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based on the facts of this case, is, in our opinion, a spectacular settlement because of the offer, because of the problems of proof, the problems of damages and the problems with liability.

And we, ultimately, split the 28 million with 40 percent going to the third-party payors. That is 11.2 million in a cash fund to the third-party payors and 60 percent to the consumers or 16.8 million available to the consumers to claim.

We then presented to Your Honor on March 2nd a preliminary approval motion.

THE COURT: Before you go into that, I believe, and it is important for the record, I believe there was a motion to dismiss filed in this case; am I correct?

MR. STRANGE: In the Simonet case there was a motion to dismiss filed before Your Honor and Your Honor did reissue an opinion on it.

THE COURT: There was an opinion because I do remember it took considerable time. And there were replies and surreplies. And I do remember Mr. Barrios, when he came in, had to request several continuances because when -- Mr. Barrios can speak about this, but I think it was the representation at that point -- again, it was not a simple 12(B)(6) motion. And it was pretty complicated and the opinion order was 20 or 25 pages long.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor, and we did in California

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follow that opinion closely in your case. And it is not unlike the complicated decisions that our court had to decide either.

THE COURT: And let me ask one thing, and also I want to hear from GSK. Let me not assume, but let me ask, did that opinion or that ruling that I issued also carry some weight, I assume, in the settlement negotiations; am I correct?

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor, it did. It was very instrumental in at least getting GlaxoSmithKline to the table. Obviously if they had won they wouldn't have settled my case either.

THE COURT: We wouldn't be here.

MR. STRANGE: We wouldn't be here. But recognizing from both sides that that was both a difficult, very complicated issue. And only one of the many issues that we were going to face along the road, both in class certification and, ultimately, should we come to a trial, whether we can prove the plaintiffs had split pills. And, if so, even if they had a split pill, what effect, how were they damaged by that. The difficulty is we are dealing with economic damages and not personal injury claims.

So, ultimately, after extensive negotiations we did get what we believed to be an excellent settlement for the class in this case with respect to the split pill issue. Your Honor had a preliminary approval hearing on March 2nd where you approved a rigorous notice program. We hired Cancilla Media, who is a

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recognized expert in the class action notice arena. They have filed two declarations with the Court outlining the notice. But suffice it to say that Cancilla Media has been involved in over 500 notice programs, hundreds of millions of dollars they spent in media. They have qualified as an expert in numerous federal courts regarding notice. And they have opined in this case both in the preliminary approval stage and in response to objections about notice that this notice meets all the requirements of Rule 23. We provided direct notice to the third-party payor class which we were able to obtain the names and addresses through information by Mr. Miller's firm, indicated in the notice. We had a broad notice for paid media which included over 2,100 newspapers, every major media market in the country. We had, in addition, consumer magazines such as NewsWeek, People and TV Guide and various trade magazines with third-party payors. We also had TV spots regarding the settlement occurred 72 times on CBS, CNN Evening News, CNN News, Lifetime Movie Channel and the Movie Channel and the Hallmark Channel; and we also had a press release that went to over 4,500 outlets. We had a dedicated website. We did a word search on Google and Yahoo, and we have an opinion from our expert that they reached over 80 percent of the market with respect to this extensive notice which cost well in excess of a million dollars.

After receiving the notice we are here today for a YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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final approval. We have -- my firm has, in particular, been certified as class counsel in numerous cases throughout the country. And, in fact, we have settled regarding the issue of Paxil that was sold to children in a case called Hormon which was in state court in Illinois on a national settlement and a third-party payor case in Minnesota on a national settlement approved by the court there. So we have experienced counsel both on the plaintiff's side, Mr. Nevares and Mr. Solas, and also on GSK's side.

And we have, after all that notice, we are down to, really, four objections that I would like to briefly address at least as the objections pertain to the final fairness hearing.

One objection -- first, I might state, in due respect, the objectors are not unknown to me, having settled numerous class actions. All of the objectors have objected in numerous other cases after a settlement has been obtained.

Mr. Pentz, who represents the Sweeney objectors, who apparently is not here today, has personally -- is a professional objector who has objected in at least five of my personal cases, including a case against Fleet Bank, a case against CitiBank, a case against Sprint up in New Jersey.

THE COURT: Is he an attorney or he is just -- I know there was somebody who objected who is not an attorney who I did not allow to object.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, you struck the Sweeney objection

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#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 because he wasn't a lawyer and then he brought in Mr. Pentz who 2 is a lawyer who is not here today, but who requested to be, I 3 think, admitted pro hac vice. 4 THE COURT: That is through Mr. Inserni. Okay. 5 MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: So he is represented by counsel. 7 MR. STRANGE: Yes, Honor. And First U.S.A. is another 8 case so Mr. Pentz has objected in numerous cases. Mr. 9 Weinstein, who is here today, is from Texas. And just doing a 10 quick search on Lexus he has objected in the In Re: Pet Food 11 Products litigation, Park vs. Thomas, McCoy vs. Health Net, 12 McGee vs. Continental Tire, Progressive Corp. vs. Corp. 13 Underwriting and In Re: Ford Explorer cases, just to name a 14 few. And the PAL Prescription Coalition has also previously objected in our cases in Illinois and the one in Minnesota. 15 16 Both objections were overruled. One of them was withdrawn 17 ultimately. 18 And the McWhorter objectors, interestingly, I was not 19 familiar with them. But they are actually listed in the Nichols versus SmithKline case as an objector where their 20 objections, same objections, similar objections were overruled 21

To get to the substance of the objections, Your Honor, the first with respect to the argument that you can't certify a national class because of differing state laws, national

in that case which is cited in our papers.

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classes based on differing state laws are certified almost routinely in this country every day. The AM-CAM case by the Supreme Court actually, I think, supports our position because that case holds that in a settlement context the issue of manageability is not one that would preclude settlement because you are not having a trial. You don't have to manage the trial.

And one of the objections raised with respect to varying state laws is you have to have different kinds of jury instructions with potentially different elements to be proved and different burdens of proof. And in a settlement context, as the Supreme Court points out, that issue goes away because you don't have a trial. And that is supported by this circuit in the waste management case that we cited. In the Warfarin case which is a 3rd Circuit case, which is a drug-related case on behalf of third-party payors and consumers, just like this case, the Court was faced with that issue and overruled that objection.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt. I understand that if this case were to go to trial there is also the issue that different state laws apply. Not under the law of every state you would have the exact same claims. The instructions may be different, but the law may be different in different states. And in some states you may have X claim under -- again, I think in my opinion I went through all the different laws of the

different states. A lot of states are alike in a lot of things, but there are some differences.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor. There are similar states and then there are the different states. But, as the Supreme Court points out, that that issue of, you know, how to manage different state laws goes away in a settlement context because you are not having a trial.

And so the -- clearly the majority of cases that have considered that issue have held that a national settlement is appropriate. And, as I mentioned, in the Warfarin case particularly the Court dealt with a case very similar to this one. I also might point out, Your Honor, that in the Hormon case which is a state court case against GlaxoSmithKline that was settled, the court certified a national class with differing state laws, and also in the federal case in Minnesota we were involved in the Court certified a national case with different state laws.

And, finally, I would point out that the objectors raise an issue of privity required in some laws, but not other laws. But that is not true of all our claims. And the controlling authority says you don't have to have identical claims and identical facts in order to certify a case on a national basis.

The only case the defendants have or the objections have come up to is in the In Re: Grand Theft Auto case, which a

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district court decision. But in that case you need to look at the facts of obviously each of the cases. And in that case it involved a grand theft auto game. And the contention of the plaintiffs was that the rating was incorrect because if you knew how to manipulate the game you could get into the part of the game that had some inappropriate sexual content. And the court in that case noted that the evidence was that 2/3 of the class did not even know about that. Even if they knew about it you had to be personally able to manipulate the game or hire a third party to change the game. So the defendant had an unclean hands defense that said if you didn't like the sexual content why were you hiring someone to get to that part of the game.

So the facts of that case are distinctly different from this case where we are contending based on the defendant's conduct in manufacturing these pills, which is the same for all the plaintiffs, that the pills were defective and could potentially split apart.

So, we have cited extensively in our brief to all of the cases which have held that certification of a case in this instance is completely appropriate. Not only appropriate, but encouraged.

The other objection I wanted to mention, Your Honor, is with respect to the claims-made portion of this settlement for the consumers only. The third-party payors, of course, are

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paid based on their -- how many covered lives they have. With respect to the claims made of the consumers, that was a negotiated term that we fought with GSK on. And the fact that we have an extensive notice program and the ability of consumers to make claims, these types of claims-made settlements are routinely approved; and, in fact, were approved in the Hormon case, which was a claims-made settlement based on Paxil. And there is no case that says it is inappropriate to have a claims-made settlement or that reversion, if you want to call it that, is inappropriate. In fact, the cases that we cited to Your Honor specifically held that that is an appropriate feature of a negotiated settlement.

The next issue I wanted to mention is notice. With respect to the notices, I have indicated that we have a very robust notice program. There was — there is an argument by PAL, the prescription access group, that the notice is insufficient because we should have subpoenaed all the pharmacies.

But that, I submit, there has only been a few cases that have done that. We have mentioned them by our supplemental experts' declaration. Two of those cases involve U.S. attorneys who negotiated with the pharmacies. The third was an order from the Court.

In these circumstances there are two distinct differences. One, of course, we have a major rights of privacy

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issues if we were to try to subpoena pharmacies. The rights of the patients not to have that information released would be a massive issue that would have to be dealt with both by our clients, the class, and by the pharmacies.

And, moreover, in this case, Your Honor, our definition is all those people that purchased Paxil, but the people that make claims are those with the split pills. In the cases, in the very, very few cases that have subpoenaed pharmacies, they are antitrust cases. So that everybody who is on the list of the pharmacy would be able to make a claim. So that's not true here because everybody at the pharmacy would not be able to make a claim. So it would be very overinclusive, very expensive, and not appropriate on the facts of this case.

The other objection with respect to notice was that the notice should have said something about reversion and should have said something about the size of the class and the amount of the claims.

This specific type of objection was overruled in the Nichols vs. SmithKline case and has been overruled in numerous other cases where the courts have held that under Rule 23 the issue of notice is to give a description of the case and how people can make a claim and how they can find more information.

And that is, specifically, the Court ruled that the notice in the Nichol's case had a description of the plaintiff's claims, the general terms of the settlement, the

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proposed allocation of the fund, the rights being released, and how people can obtain more information. Those are the exact items mentioned in our notice.

And in the Nichol's case the Court overruled the objection by the McWhorter people, the same people objecting here, that the notice had to state the amount of damages suffered by the class. Where they couldn't assess a fair assessment of the settlement the Court overruled that objection because it is not required under Rule 23.

The issue of the adequacy of representation, there seems to be a misunderstanding, but with respect to the settlement agreement, my firm along with J. D. Horton represented the third-party payors at this settlement discussion. Mr. Salas and Mr. Nevares represented the consumers. So there was separate counsel there.

And, finally, Your Honor, with respect to the PAL organization, they don't have standing to object to the third-party payors, which is an issue that we raise because they haven't identified a specific third-party payor that they represent; and we have cited the appropriate cases for standing.

And in the *Hormon* case they made the same objection and the Court ruled they didn't have standing there because they don't represent someone. They have now amended their objections on behalf of a consumer, Ms. Fox, but I will note

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS that that objection was made on July 21st. And Your Honor's 1 2 order provided that it be filed on the 18th. And so it is 3 untimely. Even if it wasn't untimely, for reasons I have 4 articulated it doesn't have merit. 5 THE COURT: When was it actually filed? I gave until 6 the 18th. 7 MR. STRANGE: I think it was filed on the 21st is the 8 file stamp. Overall, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: I assume the 18th was a --10 MR. STRANGE: It was a Saturday. 11 THE COURT: The 18th. 12 MR. STRANGE: Yes. 1.3 THE COURT: And probably Monday may have been a local 14 holiday. I will give the party that. I will give them the 15 benefit. I believe I can strike that with respect to untimely. 16 MR. STRANGE: I figured you would do that, Your Honor. 17 And I would like to point out you have been more than generous with respect to allowing these objections and we have addressed 18 them as best we can on the merits. 19 20 But, overall, Your Honor, as Your Honor knows, from the 21 order you issued and throughout the vigorous defense put up by 22 GSK in this case, to get a 28 million dollar settlement on 23 potential damages that could go anywhere, even if we won 24 liability, from 50,000 to 42 million is a superb settlement. 25 And I would make one other point, that even if we proceeded to

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trial and won under the *Boeing* case GSK would be entitled to reversion of all those damages that weren't claimed by the plaintiffs.

So the result that has been obtained for the class here is, based on the facts of this case, an excellent one and I would encourage the Court to approve it in this final fairness hearing. Unless the Court has any questions, I am finished with mine.

THE COURT: I do have some questions. I am probably going to do them out of order. But one of the objections is that since the settlement notice was sent out the date of this hearing has been changed twice. And there is a claim that, for example, a class member who wanted to be here today to object can't be here today because there is no way for him other than the original date and deadline of knowing when this hearing would have taken place.

Of course, some of the objectors have obviously appeared here. But I would like to hear from you in that respect.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor, the Courts routinely reserve the right to continue a class fairness hearing, and it routinely does happen. And in notice we cited various means for any objector who is interested to determine whether there has been a continuance either through the web site, through a toll-free number, through calling counsel.

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THE COURT: Let me assume that if I live in Montana or I live in Iowa or I live in Guam or in Alabama, and I want to object, if I look at the original notice there is a toll-free number or there is a web site that will tell me today's date and hearing.

MR. STRANGE: The web site has since changed the date. The web site didn't originally change the date. But if they called the toll-free number they would have been provided that information. And the bottom line, Your Honor, is that --

THE COURT: Okay. When was the web site date changed for today that you have?

MR. STRANGE: The date changed to today was fairly recently. I am not sure of the exact date the web site was changed. I don't know that, but I don't think the web site itself -- I could be wrong about this -- I don't think the web site date was changed on or around the time of your order. I am not sure about that. But....

THE COURT: Let me ask another thing. Let's assume there was a deadline to object.

MR. STRANGE: Yes.

THE COURT: And that deadline did not change.

That was -- actually, it did change when I extended it. Was that reflected immediately on the web site or when was that reflected?

MR. STRANGE: I am not sure whether that was reflected YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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in the web site, Your Honor. I mean, normally we probably wouldn't do that. But with respect to the objectors, to my knowledge, there certainly isn't a case where someone, you know, showed up on the original date and then had to change their — I mean, everybody that wanted to object, I believe, is here today.

THE COURT: That is great because even if we didn't have the hearing and somebody showed up I would have been informed because it has happened. Not in this case, but it has happened in other cases where persons would send letters. And I believe everybody who has objected, they are all here today.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor. I don't think there is a specific example. It would be a little speculative that someone who wanted to come didn't come. But, to my knowledge everyone, that wanted to appear is here today and knew about the continuance. And, obviously, some people wrote letters which Your Honor will consider, I understand, today.

So to the extent there have been continuances, which frequently happens, I don't think anybody has been affected by that, that I am aware of. And everybody has been able to voice their objections. And, just as a routine matter, the Court in running its daily calendar is required to continue hearings and it frequently does happen in these types of cases and everybody does their best. But there are certainly ways, if someone was interested, for them to find out about a change in the date.

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But, to my knowledge, everyone who wanted to object is here.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I have some other questions, but I think they pertain more towards to what attorney Nevares will be talking about.

MR. STRANGE: Thank you, Your Honor. At this point I would like to turn the presentation over to Mr. Nevares with respect to fees and any objections that pertain to those.

MR. HEROLD: Your Honor, Fred Herold from GSK. Would you like to hear GSK's views?

THE COURT: I was thinking about it. I think it might not be as -- it is probably going to be shorter, I think, a lot of things.

Let's do that and then I will hear from Mr. Nevares and then I will hear from all the objectors.

MR. HEROLD: Your Honor, on behalf of GSK, we do agree with plaintiffs' counsel that the objection should be overruled. I am going to try to focus on what I think are the key issues. One is the issue of the split tablets. This case, as Mr. Strange described, involved a number of difficult issues, pleading issues, legal issues and factual issues. And in any settlement there is a lot of negotiation based on the rulings, and as the case goes on, the development of those issues.

There is one key factual issue here which the parties have not agreed upon. And that is one of the core issues which

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is how many split tablets got out into the market. It's been GSK's position all along, based on documented studies of the plant process and inspections, that no more than 8 parts per million on average got out. And that is based on inspections that are done. And then when there are split tablets found there are steps taken after that to try to reduce the number of split tablets.

THE COURT: If that is the number, what would be the percent under your number? Under that number?

MR. HEROLD: Eight parts per million number. Your

Honor, I am not very good at math. But I believe it is .00008,

I believe.

THE COURT: Versus what Mr. Strange said, one or two percent.

MR. HEROLD: One or two percent, what the plaintiffs said consistently. If GSK is correct, as a factual matter, that no more than eight parts per million got out, we agree there are 700 million Paxil CR tablets that were related to the market in the United States during this time period. If you do the math at eight parts per million you come out with 5,600 split tablets. We also agree there was never a dispute that the average price of a Paxil CR tablet is three dollars. So if GSK is right there are 5,600 split tablets out there with a value of three dollars, the case is worth \$16,600.

Now, obviously as Mr. Strange said, the plaintiffs did

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not agree with that. That was a matter we had to choose whether to try or not. GSK is not in a position, nor the plaintiffs, to say, okay, we know that Mrs. Smith in Oklahoma got a split tablet. GSK does not have records of who actually purchased its drugs, who actually take its drugs. There are all kinds of privacy issues involved in that. GSK sell to a wholesaler. Doctors prescribes the drugs. GSK knows how many of its drugs are prescribed, but it doesn't know who takes them. And none of us are in a position to be able to prove, and we think this is a strength for GSK in the case, who took a split tablet, who got a split tablet.

So the ultimate compromise that we reached, Your Honor, in a key part of the settlement here is that GSK agreed to put up up to 28 million dollars total, 16.8 million, for the consumer class, which we believe was more than enough by a factor of almost 1,000 to cover the damages that we think are out there. As long as that that amount was not claimed, because we don't think there are that many split tablets out there, we don't have to pay it. That was a key part of the settlement.

And one of the core objections here is that, you know, that is not fair. Because GSK should have to pay the whole thing. Well, we could have gone to trial. And we think we would have prevailed on the issue of how many split tablets there were. So that was a key part of the settlement that we

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will put up the money, but if it is not claimed -- well, actually the way it works technically, we only pay for the claims that are made, as Mr. Strange said, it is a claims-made policy on the consumers' side.

The other issue, Your Honor, which is important is we worked very hard to come up with what we thought was a fair claims process. Especially for consumers. We have a two-tiered claims process. A consumer is entitled to fifty dollars if he or she simply fills out a form, no notary. Some objections talk about a notary. There is no notary requirement in the settlement. Simply fills out a firm that says, "I declare under penalty of perjury that I got at least one split tablet." That is all they have to do.

I can tell that you it was a very difficult decision for GSK to agree to that because we have experience in these kinds of settlements where that is all you require where you get a lot of claims that you don't think are legitimate. That is all we agreed in this case. The minimal amount of fifty dollars is enough to cover 17 split tablets, 16-2/3 split tablets at three dollars each. So we think that is a very generous, very generous and fair process.

Now, the odds statistically of someone getting more than 17 split tablets, one consumer getting more than 17 split tablets, are extremely small. No matter whose version you accept, the eight parts per million or the one to two percent.

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We, therefore, felt if you are going to claim more than that amount you have to come up with something in addition to your word. And, again, we were very generous. What we agreed to was that the consumer would only have to come up with one of about six or seven things, some kind of demonstration of the payment or proof of a prescription or even a not from their doctor. And it doesn't have to say, "I got a split tablet."

The claimant has to say, "I got a split tablet," and a note from the doctor saying, "I prescribed this patient Paxil CR."

That's it. Very, very minimal. And if one does that they get fifty dollars plus ten dollars per split tablet on top of tier one, the minimal amount. Again, we think that is a very generous, very fair way to administer this settlement. And, frankly, much more lenient than is typically done.

Also, with respect to notice, Your Honor, I would like to second very strongly what Mr. Strange said about the notion that we should subpoen pharmacies and get individual information about the names and addresses of who took Paxil CR from those pharmacies. That raises a whole host of privacy issues. There is a federal statute called HIPAA -- just, I mean one can imagine, if you are taking Paxil CR, which is an antidepressant, you may not want someone, your local pharmacy, without your knowledge providing your name and address to anybody.

It is typically not done in these cases. It is

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extremely unusual.

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THE COURT: So what would happen is if there is a subpoena or a court order, what would happen, for example — let's assume this pharmacy doesn't exist — but let's assume there is a Walgreen's pharmacy at 153 Chardon Avenue, across the street. And let's assume that you get that listing from that pharmacy. Counsel would have to review it, but from that listing whoever reads it you find there are 20 people who have taken Paxil tablets. Among them perhaps — the problem is, let's assume a federal judge is taking Paxil, myself. And let's assume that. But if that is the case, when you get that discovery I may not want to be a claimant in this case.

MR. HEROLD: Exactly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I don't want anybody knowing. Of course, the F.B.I. knew it when they did the check. That may be an issue. I will put myself as an example. It might invade my privacy. It won't become public, but it will be disseminated to third parties.

MR. HEROLD: That's correct, Your Honor. Especially, as Mr. Strange said, it is not a case like you have in a securities case or in an antitrust case where you purchase the product you are entitled to damages. Here that is just the first step. If you purchase the product we can send you a notice voiding all these privacy issues, but then you still have to personally say you got a split tablet. So it just

seems like A) tremendous privacy problems; b) tremendous overkill in this kind of case.

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And as the notice expert in this case we have used in many cases, Cancilla, stated that the program that we had here was a rigorous program; one that is of the type that is routinely approved for notice to consumers in these types of cases.

And the other point I just wanted to make on notice is that there has been a complaint that the notice that went out didn't adequately notify the consumers of all the details of the settlement.

You can't do that, Your Honor. You can't have a 30- or 40-page settlement agreement sent to everyone interested. It just doesn't work that way. It is a complicated settlement agreement, as they all are. You have to come up with a notice that meets the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. The notice in this case was extensive. It had a number of Q-and-A type of sections. And, most importantly, if someone truly was interested in knowing every detail of the settlement they easily could have determined that.

How? Number one, the settlement was posted on the web site. The web site address is all over all the notices in multiple places. All you had to do was go on the web site and click the settlement agreement and you can read it to your heart's content. In fact, I shouldn't admit this, but my

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filing system in my office leaves a lot to be desired. Often when I want to find the settlement agreement in this case I go to the web site. It takes two seconds to get to the settlement agreement. Very easy. In the notice there are directions if you want to call a number, if you have questions. It was a very comprehensive, detailed notice program. And it's just impractical to require that any notice that goes out to the public would contain every single detail, you know, of a court settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Let me just ask what would happen if a 71-year-old grandmother who is computer illiterate and she just watches soap operas during the afternoon and she goes to play bingo. How would that woman find out about the class action.

MR. HEROLD: Well, Your Honor, that woman would find out in one of the number of ways that Mr. Strange described. The class — the notice was published in multiple magazines. I don't remember, frankly, the specifics of which ones. But typically it's something like Reader's Digest, Time Magazine. There were TV ads taken out. And this is all figured out by Cancilla who has detailed information about the demographics reached by different types of magazines. So, for example, older folks might read Readers Digest more and, you know, other people might read Business Week. So they come up with a program based on all those demographics designed to maximize the chance that that person is going to get notice.

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And once that person gets notice, if they want to know more and they don't have a computer, all they have to do is pick up the phone because all the notices, whether it is TV or in a magazine provide a toll-free number for people to call and ask questions.

And, frankly, Your Honor, that is a good example of the 70-year-old woman in Massachusetts. I doubt is going to call up and say, "I was thinking about this, but I want to know if there is a claims-made policy in the reversion." That is not going to happen. Those kinds of questions are questions that are reviewed and asked by people who make it their business to object to settlement agreements across the country and raise those issues.

And, certainly, the proof is in the pudding. Those folks have emerged in this case and have understood basically the nature of the settlement and they are here today to bring up these issues, which are perfectly fine.

So, again, it is a balance. If we went out there and said, now, let's explain the settlement in gory detail the woman in Massachusetts would be overwhelmed and wouldn't be able to make any decision. So you have to draw that balance between notice that is adequate.

THE COURT: And let me ask, let's assume that I approve the settlement how -- and, again, that woman has not objected. She doesn't know anything. The settlement has been approved,

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS but she is a possible claimant. She can fill out one of these 1 2 forms and get her fifty dollars or maybe one hundred fifty 3 dollars. How would she get notice? She hasn't gotten it until 4 today. And let's assume I approve the settlement a week or 10 5 days from now. Is there any way she can get notice if she 6 hasn't gotten notice thus far? 7 MR. HEROLD: I have to look and see how long the notice 8 program goes. I don't know whether it is over or it is still 9 going. 10 The notice program goes until August 10th. So it is 11 still going. There are still publications out there. The web 12 site is still up. The toll-free number is still there. You 1.3 can't have a perfect notice plan. 14 THE COURT: I am aware of that. 15 MR. HEROLD: But it is best tracked and so we kept the 16 notice plan going through the end of the period to cover that 17 woman in that particular situation. 18 Your Honor, that is all I have. If you have any questions I would be happy to address them. 19 20 THE COURT: No. Let's hear from Mr. Nevares. 21 MR. SALAS: Your Honor, may I address the Court for a 2.2 couple of matters. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. SALAS: Camilo Salas, and I was originally 25 cocounsel with Mr. Nevares representing Alma Simonet, the

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original plaintiff in the suit that was filed here; and, subsequently by way of the preliminary approval order appointed by the Court as counsel for the consumer class.

Your Honor, I just wanted to touch on two matters that I might be in a better position to discuss with the Court.

One is with respect to the history of this case.

Mr. Nevares and I investigated this case beginning in 2005 when there were reports of seizure by the governmental authorities here in Panama of the Paxil tablets that were --

THE COURT: We are not in Panama.

MR. SALAS: We are in Puerto Rico, excuse me. That we are here in Puerto Rico in the manufacturing facilities. We spent a lot of time obtaining the governmental records to learn more about the case. And, subsequently, in April of '06 after doing a lot of discovery, not formal discovery, but informal discovery we went ahead and filed the suit.

When we filed the suit GSK filed initially one motion to dismiss. The case was not in front of Your Honor at the time. It was in front of another judge. And when Your Honor became a full judge the case was transferred to you. When we amended our complaint, then the defendants filed another motion to dismiss, which Your Honor took under advisement. And, as a result of which, Your Honor wrote a very lengthy opinion which, quite honestly, has become very informative to us in other cases because it basically discusses the law of Puerto Rico and

what are the types of claims that can be brought in this jurisdiction in similar cases.

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Once Your Honor ruled in our favor there Your Honor set a meeting with the magistrate judge to select the trial date and discovery deadlines. And following a meeting with the magistrate judge which GSK argued that discovery should be limited only to class certification issues, and what we argued was that discovery should include all issues. It was then that they relented when we were about to start full discovery here in Puerto Rico. We started settlement negotiations with GSK.

And that brings me to the second point, which is that at that point without counsel for the third-party payors; and at that time we did not represent any third-party payors, and third-party payors were not part of this case. I began negotiations directly with GSK and traveled to Philadelphia and met with them. Subsequently, Mr. Nevares joined me in at least one meeting in Philadelphia where we discussed settlement. And subsequent to that there were several other meetings which lasted — that went on for a period of one year until a settlement was finally reached.

During those meetings I represented the consumer class. I argued on their behalf and I advocated on their behalf. So the allegations that have been made here that the consumer class has not been properly represented because there has been represented by lawyers who also represented third-party payors

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 is simply not true. I have never represented third-party 2 payors. I represented the consumer class. I represented them 3 very well together with Mr. Nevares in all of those 4 negotiations. 5 And finally, Judge, just one thing I want to call to 6 Your Honor's attention. 7 THE COURT: Let me just -- you are representing the 8 consumer class. 9 MR. SALAS: Yes, I have been appointed by the Court to 10 represent the consumer class. 11 THE COURT: Can you refresh my recollection as to who 12 represents the third-party payors. 13 MR. SALAS: Mr. Brian Strange was appointed by the 14 Court to represent the third-party payors. 15 THE COURT: I just wanted to get that clear for the 16 record. Okay. 17 MR. SALAS: Even today, as we sit here today, we are 18 together in that we represent the whole class, but we have our 19 specific instructions, if you would, to represent those 20 specific classes, and I think we have done that very well. And 21 we have advocated for the subclasses that we really represent. 2.2 Your Honor, the other item was something that you just 23 asked a little while ago. I think it is clear now, but you asked whether or not notice of this hearing would have been 24

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given or will be known to certain individuals.

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Just I call the Court's attention to paragraph 25 of the original approval order where you indicated that the date of the final approval hearing could be changed without further notice other than which may be posted at the Court, at the Court's web site and/or at the web site established under the notice plan.

So basically there was notice there given that any changes in the scheduling could be subject, could take place and would be posted in the Court's own web site or whatever the Court does. That is all I have, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Before I hear from Mr. Nevares, one last thing, would there be any objection, and assuming that I approve the settlement, if, for example, in the -- not only the -- well, because in the web site for the settlement, for example, I allow 10 more working -- until August 10th, for example, to file any other objections; and that appears specifically, would there be any objection as to something like that? That really doesn't change the nature of anything, but it gives that little extra added window of opportunity to anybody else who, you know, who specifically appeared on the site. And that is something that whoever is in charge of the site could probably change right now. Would there be any objection as to that?

MR. SALAS: Your Honor, would that be additional time to file additional objections or to file claims?

THE COURT: Objections.

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MR. HEROLD: Your Honor, GSK would object to that.

There has been quite a long time to file objections in this case. The original deadline was out there for quite a long time. The Court extended it, and I just checked. The settlement web site was updated to show the hearing date here.

THE COURT: Today.

MR. HEROLD: Yes, it took a little while. I believe it was done on July 17th. It was updated, but it was updated. As Mr. Salas just stated, it's the original notice.

THE COURT: You gave me that date. I was under the impression. Because today is the 27th. I just wanted to make sure that it wasn't changed, for example, the 25th.

MR. HEROLD: No.

THE COURT: Or last Friday.

MR. HEROLD: It was changed. It took a while to get it on the web site. But the problem is, Your Honor, today is the fairness hearing. I think technically if the objection period is extended --

THE COURT: We would have to have another fairness hearing.

MR. SALAS: And another notice.

MR. HEROLD: And there has been plenty of time to object, Your Honor, as demonstrated by the fact that a number of the objectors are here and the types of objections you see

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#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 here are -- I would be surprised if there are additional ones 2 that somebody comes up with. They pretty much cover the 3 gambit. The Court has been fair with respect to allowing 4 objections and extending the deadline. 5 THE COURT: Let me also ask something else that is 6 related. When was the deadline for opting out of any class? 7 MR. HEROLD: I believe that was July --8 MR. SALAS: 1st. MR. HEROLD: Second, was it? 9 10 THE COURT: I believe no one has opted out of the 11 class. 12 MR. HEROLD: There were a few opt outs, Your Honor, but 13 very few. 14 THE COURT: Those haven't been filed with the Court. MR. HEROLD: No. 15 THE COURT: Do you know how many? 10, 15 or 20? 16 17 MR. HEROLD: We could find that out, Your Honor. 18 MR. STRANGE: I think it is stated in our motion, Your 19 Honor, at the time we filed our motion for final approval I 20 think we stated the number of consumer opt outs. 21 THE COURT: And none of those opt outs are represented 22 by any of the counsel who are objecting here today. 23 MR. HEROLD: No, Your Honor, I believe if a consumer 24 changes to opt out they also give up the right to object 25 because they are not a part of this.

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THE COURT: Perhaps somebody who opted out is represented by attorney Z and attorney Z is representing somebody else who objected. I assume none of the counsel are the same for objectors or people who are opting out.

MR. HEROLD: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.

MR. SALAS: Their claims will not be extinguished by the settlement, Judge, once they object.

Any opt out they can't ask for the fifty THE COURT: dollars or the one hundred fifty dollars. They can sue and they can go to any state and --

MR. SALAS: And sue, yes.

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MR. STRANGE: Your Honor, the opt out deadline was actually May 15th.

THE COURT: Okay. So that passed a long time ago.

MR. STRANGE: Yeah, and there was one request from a consumer to opt out at that point.

THE COURT: Okay. So only one opt out in a timely manner/

MR. STRANGE: For a consumer, yes, Your Honor.

MR. SALAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Nevares.

MR. NEVARES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is John Nevares and I represent plaintiffs' class counsel. Let me start by saying -- by addressing an objection that has been raised by Sweeney, PAL and Weinstein, which is -- which

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involves the attorneys' fees. These objectors cite two cases in support of the fact that the attorneys' fees awarded to counsel for the class should come out of the amount of claims actually logged in with the claims administrator that we have, you know, as part of the process.

The problem that these objectors have is that they mislead the Court when they cite *In Re: T.J. Companies Retail Security*, a case from the District of Massachusetts from 2008. You can find that 584 Fed. Sup. 2nd, 395. And they also cite Strong vs. Bell South Communications Inc., 173, FRD, 167, from 1997.

Those two cases are inapplicable to our case.

THE COURT: Actually, in that *Strong* case there is a circuit citation, 137, F.3rd, 844, 5th Circuit.

MR. NEVARES: What I am trying to convey to the Court is the following: This case is totally different from the factual scenario both in Strong and in *TJX*. And I shall explain to you why.

In this case we were able to get a common benefit fund of twenty-eight million dollars in cash for the claimants, for the class. In *TJX*, for example, that was a case about the hacking into a computer system and getting the credit card information of about 45,000 persons. In that case there was no common fund. And counsel used the low-start method.

But to make things worse, both in TJX and in the Strong YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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case that I just cited, the benefit to the class were credits, benefits other than cash. In our case the benefit to the class is the recovery of what they paid for Paxil CR during the period 2002 to 2005.

So that is why you will see when the Court writes the TJX opinion saying that this 175 million fund is illusory. And you will see that when they write about *Strong* and their sixty-four million dollars in credits. This was a case involving Bell South and the fact that they charged the people that used telephones and certain amounts in excess of what they should have charged. And what they offered was a fund of sixty-four million in credits. And that has been referred to in other cases as a phantom because the money is not there for the claimant to have the incentive to go to the claims administrator and collect money.

Here we have twenty-eight million dollars in cash for this consumer class to access and get reimbursed.

So the judge in the TJX case was preoccupied with the fact that he was being presented a settlement that was not fair and reasonable. And that is why you see him write, go to great lengths to write about maybe in such a situation where the settlement is not fair and reasonable we should adopt the number of claims that are logged in in the settlement. And depending on the number of claims that are logged in, then we apply a percentage to compensate attorneys.

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That is simply not the case before us. In the case before us we worked very hard. And one thing counsel, my brother counsel, forgot to say is that I spent four months traveling the island from east to west and north to south to find ex-employees of GlaxoSmithKline to find out facts about their production of Paxil CR at the Cidra plant. And that took most of my time, including Saturdays and Sundays until I interviewed somewhere between 20 and 30 ex-employees of GlaxoSmithKline. And that was a very important aspect of this case in that the defendant was not comfortable with the fact that I was doing discovery, finding out information about their practices in that plant in Cidra which was eventually shut down and that also brought us to settlement.

Now, again, not to repeat myself, but when you hear the objectors come in and cite to you these two cases the TJX Companies Retail Security case and the Strong/Bellsouth Telecommunications, you have to understand that these are two settlements with which the Court was not happy because they were not reasonable and they were not fair. Those cases have been cited thereafter by circuit courts, because these are district court cases, and they also repeat the same theme, that the Strong and TJX cases were cases that were phantoms because they were offering things that were not money. They were offering credits, you know, and other things that we are not offering here. Here we are offering cash refunds. Strictly

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cash refunds in a common benefit fund of twenty-eight million dollars.

So I want you to, you know, I want to start off by distinguishing these two cases from the line of cases that I am going to argue to you now that sets the stage, sets what the rule is in these class action cases in terms of awarding attorneys' fees. And that starts with the very well-known seminal case of Boeing vs. Van Gambert, 444 U.S., 472, 1980. In that case the Supreme Court — the United States Supreme Court held that the attorney's fees are calculated on the entire fund created and not on claims made against the fund.

The Court is very clear and precise in its language.

And that is the rule that has become the common fund doctrine,

which is what we seek the Court to apply here.

If you see, for example, the case of Williams vs. -- I think I missed a case. If you see a very enlightening case also on the common fund doctrine when awarding attorney's fees in class actions it would be Waters vs. International Precious Metals Corporation 190 F.3d, 1291. That is a case out of the 11th Circuit which holds one thing that is noteworthy. It holds that no case has held that district court must considers only actual payout, which is what these objectors are trying the Court to do.

THE COURT: Let me ask something, when you say they are asking for actual payout, my impression is that what the

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objection is is that the attorneys not receive the 30 percent attorneys' fees. Are the objectors requesting they only receive the value of their services or what exactly?

MR. NEVARES: These objectors that I just mentioned, Sweeney, Weinstein and PAL are relying on those two cases I just cited to you, TJX and Strong, for the proposition that we, as class counsel, should collect only from those claims that are actually made. Not from the fund of 28 million dollars. That is one of their objections. And that is why I am trying to explain to you that that is not — that those two cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar for many — for all the reasons that I have already set forth.

What I am doing now is taking you to the standard that is -- that the majority of the circuits apply, which is Common Fund Doctrine or Loadstar.

However, if you bear with me I will take you through the case law so you will see how the Loadstar is being used by the courts, the circuit courts. The majority of the circuits are going under the Common Fund Doctrine and they are using the Loadstar as a collateral source to check and see whether the multiplier of the Loadstar is fair enough in order to warrant the award of attorneys' fees sought by the class counsel. In this case, as you know, we are seeking 8,741,329.19. If you deduct the costs, which is \$159,953.90, you are left with attorney fees approval sought in the amount of 8,581,375 —

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THE COURT: 8.5 approximately.

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MR. NEVARES: 8.5 which is 30.65 percent from the common fund. But I was going to get there in terms of justifying the fairness and the reasonableness of the percentage sought. But before I do that, I want to emphasize to the Court that the Common Fund Doctrine is the methodology that is being applied by the circuit courts, which is a percentage approved by the Court against the entire fund.

And that is what we are -- that is what our papers say and that is what I just -- those numbers that I gave you are the -- what we are seeking as compensation and the percentage.

Very enlightening to prove and to justify our fees is the opinion by Professor Miller who has worked on class action settlements for years and has made an analysis of this case, which is attached as an exhibit.

It is the declaration of Professor Jeffrey Miller. He has spent years opining on class certification and preparing databases. He has reviewed over 1200 cases to come up with one of his opinions. This opinion by Professor Miller basically justifies the amount of attorneys' fees that we seek.

If you go to page five he says that the Loadstar multiplier in this case is 2.03. And then says that that is on the low end of all the Loadstar multipliers that he has studied throughout the years from his databases. Most of the multipliers are upwards of three, four, and even five.

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He also justifies the 30.65 percent because he has made studies that appear in page 8 and page 9 of his opinion where he sets forth the percentages. If you look at page 8, for example, he says, "average attorneys' fee as percentage of settlement it goes into 31 -- 30, 31, 32. And these are all class actions. All these tables deal with class actions. And he also opines that the Common Fund Doctrine is the superior method of calculating the attorney's fees that should be awarded to class counsel.

In his opinion, he says that the Loadstar approach has become disfavored over time because of a number of significant drawbacks relative to the percentage approach. Among other shortcomings he says is the Loadstar approach is burdensome to apply, creates perverse incentives for class counsel to protract the litigation, and fails to align the interests of counsel with also the class. And then he finally says, the methodology of Common Fund Doctrine is a superior method for validating the reasonableness of class counsel fees.

However, he does mention that it is a good idea to do
the Loadstar cross-check. And if you look at page 12 you will
see that a sampling of Loadstar multipliers go from 9.3 down to
4.4 and we are at 2.003 in this case. So it is more than
reasonable what we seek as a Loadstar cross-check or a Loadstar
multiplier if the Court wishes to use that as a cross-check.

Now, going back to my argument on the case law, I want

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to make it abundantly clear how -- why I say that the Common Fund Doctrine is the law of the land these days, and I don't say it. I mean, it started -- if you go back to 1882 you will find case law that already recognizes this kind of approach. But, really, the seminal case is Boeing vs. Van Gambert, which I already cited. But I want to take you through a couple of cases that are also very important following Boeing. I was in Waters vs. International Precious Metals, 190 F.3d., 1291 from the 11th Circuit. Again, that case distinguishes Strong cases cited by objectors at page 6 because there was no fund in Strong, to start with, over and above the other things that i already mentioned.

And also states -- the 11th Circuit also states, again,
I think I said this before, that no case has held that the
district court must consider only actual payout.

Then, I want to take you to Williams vs. MGM Path

Communications Company where Boeing is followed. And there the

9th Circuit held that it was an error to base attorneys' fees

on claims against the fund, rather the entire fund or Loadstar

where the options given by the 9th Circuit in this case.

Another point that I want to bring up that this case discusses, 129 F.3d, 1026, is what happens to the monies that are not claimed. Well, this case recognizes that it is that those monies can be returned in this case to GSK for those claimants that didn't claim out of the 28-million-dollar pot.

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To that effect, at page 1027, the Court citing Boeing states that as follows: The Court concluded that the attorneys for successful class may recover a fee based on the entire common fund created for the class even if some members make no claims against the fund so that money remains in it that otherwise would be returned to the defendants.

So I think that the argument that, you know, that money cannot be returned to the defendant fails if one reads Williams vs. MGM Path Communications.

THE COURT: So even, the argument, let's assume that the only person who files the form is Ms. Simonet, the settlement is approved. Then it is the same as if 300 persons had filed under that case law.

MR. NEVARES: Yes, because what the Courts look at is the work put in by the attorneys to reach the common fund. And as you have heard here, we have gone to great lengths to reach this settlement and that is the emphasis the Court makes when evaluating the award of attorneys' fees for reasonableness.

THE COURT: Let me ask, for instance, you mentioned the Loadstar. There is some very recent case law. This case I have before me, the highest that I have seen lately in the attorneys' fees award. I will give you the name of the case under the Loadstar -- I will explain to you why I am making reference to this -- it is in civil case 03-2317, Perez Gimenez, P.G. It is Guillemard vs. Contreras case. That is a

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civil rights case. One plaintiff vs. one defendant in personal and official capacity. It is three plaintiffs, but the plaintiff's company, the plaintiff's wife, vs. one defendant or the personal capacity under 1983 and then the Commonwealth or the same party in the official capacity for injunctive relief purposes.

That case went to trial. Went up on appeal and interlocutory. And attorneys' fees under the Loadstar. And again, it was complex I think because -- it wasn't complex, but it was protracted litigation because I think the defense litigated this case very highly. But the total attorneys' fees awarded in that case were 1,525,000 -- no, about one million and a half. And that is a simple political discrimination case that took some time to be tried.

What I would like to ask, just to get an idea, because this is a compared to -- if this case went to trial, if this type of case went to trial -- that case went to trial, if this case were to go to trial, I assume that even under Loadstar conceivably and let's assume it goes to trial, gets appealed and is affirmed on appeal, but with all the attorneys' fees it is not unreasonable, and this is obviously a case where you are going to need more than this political discrimination case. There were three attorneys working for the plaintiffs and they were approved by the Court. Assuming if this case were to go to court GlaxoSmithKline would not only have counsel here

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present, but would have two or three attorneys; am I correct?

It would be a litigation.

MR. HEROLD: I'm afraid you're right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you would have your appellate attorney also sitting in the back row. I would assume we would have here Mr. Nevares, Mr. Strange and Mr. Salas and, perhaps, one or two other counsel. But if this case were to go to trial, and I assume this with all the causation and all the experts, probably we would have a couple of Daubert hearings; but if this case were to go to trial, I think at least from the -- if plaintiffs were to prevail, and obviously, this is not 1983. So it is not automatic attorneys' fees, but based on if we look at the Loadstar, and if the attorneys' fees were available, I would assume we are talking about maybe in the neighborhood of anywhere within a reasonableness from anywhere from three to It could be 7 million dollars in attorneys' fees because of the class issue. Of course, we would have to have the Court certify the class if that got litigated. We could be here in this case maybe six years or five years easily. Even though on rocket docket this would not be -- as the motion to dismiss, the Court's ruling in this case denying the motion to dismiss in part and granting in part, it is not a simple case.

I would assume, and based on my experience, this is a case that could generate, again, anywhere from three to six, maybe even more, million dollars. And some of the rates I will

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just quote briefly from the Guillemard case. But, for example, and actually that case mentions Mr. Nevares because he has tried other cases here. So let me just for example cite Mr. Nevares' -- this is at page 11 of docket 556. This is amended order awarding attorneys fees. It is a very thorough opinion. It rates attorneys' rates throughout the years, but for example, this is a case called Sueiro Vazquez where attorney Nevares worked.

MR. NEVARES: I remember that case.

THE COURT: In that case Mr. Nevares, based on his experience, and he has been an attorney since approximately 1980, it is almost 30 years of experience, but he was awarded, this was maybe three or four years ago, maybe even more, 265 for out-of-court work, 285 for in-court work. So I would assume that — when was that case, Mr. Nevares, do you remember?

MR. NEVARES: Yes, I remember that case very well.

That involved the Historic Preservation Society and I represented two public officials that had been dismissed for political reasons.

THE COURT: When was that? One was in 2001/2002.

MR. NEVARES: I believe it was -- I mean, I have tried so many case it is hard to pin it down. But I believe it was sometime in 2002, or 2003 that we actually tried the case before Judge Garcia. And it was appealed.

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THE COURT: Let's assume Mr. Nevares' rates for Puerto Rico, 300 now and 320 or 325 for in-court now. Mr. Salas, you appeared before me. I assume you are basically in that same boat.

MR. SALAS: Actually Judge, we are a little bit higher.

Our rent is higher down in New Orleans.

THE COURT: But you have been practicing for the same time as Mr. John Nevares, Mr. Salas. The Court knows. We have done a lot of cases together.

Since you are out of state that might be justified and I believe -- Mr. Strange, how many years of experience do you have?

MR. STRANGE: I have been practicing since 1981 also.

approximately. But out-of-court counsel -- out-of-state counsel would probably be awarded a higher award. I am not in agreement with that, but I think it discriminates against local counsel, but I think sometimes you need out-of-state counsel as well, and usually the rates are going to be higher as happened in the Guillemard case. The counsel from Massachusetts was awarded a higher rate.

This is a case that would take three or four counsel on plaintiff's side. And that case, again, if we would have to have the class action, I am sure there would be the class action hearing. There would be numerous, I would say, I would

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use the word Solomon Grundy of discovery issues before magistrate judges and myself. Then there is a Rule 56 stage of the case. And I am sure summary judgment motions would probably be, if I would pile them up, the plaintiffs and the defendants, they would probably be with the exhibits taller than me. Probably taller than Yao Ming so we would have a lot of exhibits.

If that would be the case, summary judgment, assuming the case would go to trial, you can give me a rough estimate, two or three months.

MR. NEVARES: Easily.

THE COURT: Counsel, if you are going to object you may say it won't take that long. Assuming the case went all the way. So under a Loadstar -- again, this is just an approximation, because hopefully, as I hope, I don't have to try this case. If there are any objectors in Puerto Rico I hope they end up somewhere else except in the courtroom. With one single plaintiff this could take a long time to get tried.

With the Daubert hearings which would probably be as lengthy as the trial. They could be dispositive, but if the Court were to rule in plaintiff's favor and, again, there may be cross Daubert hearings. I am sure the plaintiffs would try to strike the defense experts and vice versa.

So, again, this is a case that conceivably we could have three million dollars in attorneys' fees. Under Loadstar

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it could be five million. It could be six. It would all depend. But, again, within the range or the realm of reasonableness it could be within that range. I just wanted to note that.

Okay. Mr. Nevares, you may continue.

MR. NEVARES: Yes, continuing, I couldn't agree with you more in terms of your exposition, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Again, I base that based on I was a magistrate judge for five years and a district court judge for three years now, almost three years and about a week. That is my professional estimate of what this litigation could cost in Loadstar. And I assume counsel for Glaxo, if you were to bill your clients, it is very -- we know from that perspective this could probably cost somewhere in that ballpark of attorneys' fees as well. Am I correct?

MR. HEROLD: I'm afraid to answer, but I think you are correct, Your Honor, at least.

THE COURT: And then, of course, you could have other fee arrangements. Let's assume a different law firm were to try this or handle this. It could run up to that range, a similar class action.

Let's continue, Mr. Nevares.

MR. NEVARES: I want to cite to you a case that where I was counsel in my early days. It was the Dupont fire class action. In that case there were opinions issued by the 1st

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Circuit Court of Appeals pertaining to attorneys' fees. I am referring to 56 F.3d, 295. And noteworthy is the fact that the 1st Circuit stated that and I cite, temporary to — and this is a 1995 case, contrary to popular belief it is the Loadstar method, not the POF method that breaks from precedent.

Traditionally counsel fees in common fund cases were computed as a percentage of the fund subject, of course, to consideration of reasonableness. And it cites a case from the United States Supreme Court, Central Railroad and Banking Company vs. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, at page 127 and 128 from 1885. That is why I mentioned earlier that this doctrine goes back to the 19th Century. It is basically written, as you say, Your Honor, in New Hampshire granite.

Let me turn to other issues that have been raised because I think I made my point as to what methodology computing attorneys fees should be. There are other cases I can cite to you from other circuits or if you wish I can discuss those with you.

THE COURT: It is not necessary. And let me say this, this might save time for everybody and objecting counsel may argue otherwise. But, again, I understand that even if we were to use the Loadstar fee, the attorney fee here is not, per se, unreasonable had this case proceeded all the way. That's my finding, based on my experience.

So, again, that may save everybody some time. You may YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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argue that I am wrong. I am sure Mr. Nevares is not going to argue that. I am sure Mr. Nevares is not going to argue that. My feeling is I may disagree and perhaps I may say it should be 7 million rather than 8.5, but, again, it is not outside the range of reasonableness of the Court's experience had this case gone all the way and applied the Loadstar method.

MR. NEVARES: I also want to point out, one of the objectors cites the case of Weinberger vs. Great Northerner, 925 F.2nd at 518 from the 1st Circuit in support of his position that there has to be an itemization of all the tasks performed by counsel. The problem Mr. Weinstein has is that case is not applicable to the case at bar. That case involved attorneys fees, to the attorneys' fees made in conjunction with voluntary discontinuance of a class action suit under circumstances where there was no common fund. And fees were to be paid out of a clear sailing agreement. So that case is simply again, just like Strong and TJX, not applicable to the case at bar because of the circumstances that I just pointed out.

Your Honor had discussed hourly rates. I had case law on hourly rates on *Love vs. Mayo* on Sunday, Westlaw 2709975 from 2007 the Court approves hourly rates in a class action suit between 305 and 690 dollars and 245 dollars for paralegals. If you look at In Re: Priceline 2007, Westlaw 2111592, The award of attorneys' fees totals 30 percent of an

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80 million settlement and approves the Loadstar cross-check.

And the hourly rate there is a range from 50 dollars to 770 dollars per hour. Do you have any questions, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Again, the Loadstar here for Puerto Rico, Mr. Nevares, you are one of the highest attorneys in this Court, based on your experience and the civil rights case and litigation. I am talking three or four years ago you were 285 in court and 265. So you are probably, again, 300 or 325 in court, 300 out of court. And out-of-state attorneys, they would be making at least that much or maybe a little bit more in their respective jurisdictions. But even if we apply it within Puerto Rico you are all within that range.

I would have to know, Mr. Strange, obviously for this type of class action litigation, particularly for the procedural and the other very technical matters, he is very experienced also, and that could weigh out because of his expertise. I don't think anybody here in Puerto Rico in all these class action cases there are usually counsel from outside. So he would probably be compensated more.

So, again, my finding is based on the Loadstar, it is within the range of reasonableness.

MR. NEVARES: Anything further, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Nothing further.

MR. NEVARES: Thank you, Your Honor, for your time.

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Let me hear from counsel for GSK, if there is anything you wish to add. If not, I will start hearing from objecting counsel.

MR. HEROLD: No, Your Honor. GSK has agreed not to object to the request.

THE COURT: Okay.

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Let me ask one additional thing before I hear the objections and either side and then the objectors can also address this. I know there is the cy pres issue here. C-Y, separate word, P-R-E-S, and that means that whatever funds are not collected or presented funds that are not collected go to a nonprofit that deals with the issue.

My question is just to get it on the record, let's assume only Ms. Simonet fills out the form. Attorneys collect their 8.5 million. There is still 20 million there left in the pot. Do those 20 million -- are those 20 million under the cy pres doctrine or is it just a percentage?

MR. STRANGE: Your Honor, Brian Strange for the record. The way the settlement works, with respect to the third-party payors there is 11.2 million dollars in cash. That money is distributed pro rata to the third-party payors.

THE COURT: You know who those are.

MR. STRANGE: We know who those are.

THE COURT: There is no reversion.

MR. STRANGE: There is no reversion.

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THE COURT: So that means there is 8,000 -- I mean, eight million or nine million dollars for the individual claimants.

MR. STRANGE: For the third-party payors, yes, and then there is 16.8 allocated for the consumers. And after the subtraction of the notice, cost, administration and the attorneys' fees the amount of consumer claims are paid and there won't be any money left over because that is a claims-made policy. GSK has agreed to pay up to 16.8 million for the consumers plus the percentage of the notice, administration and attorneys' fees.

THE COURT: But only if Ms. Simonet requests her 50 dollars or her 150 dollars, would that whole money go to the cy pres or what happens.

MR. STRANGE: With respect to the 16.8 million normally a cy pres would work if there is a cash, you know, if there is 16.8 million, and not that many people claim there is an amount of money that could go to a charity under one version of a settlement. This version is it goes back to GSK. GSK is not going to get 16.8 million. Assuming Your Honor approves the attorneys' fees, let's say for example, it is 8.5 million, 60 percent of that comes out of the 16.8. So that is, approximately, you know whatever, five million. Then costs of notice comes out of that. Six percent of the cost of the notice and the administration come out of that. So even if

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only a few people claimed then instead of spending 16.8 million, GSK would spend, you know, would take 6.8 million.

THE COURT: Let me ask, there is a consumer class and then there is third-party payor. Let's assume the attorneys' fees are 8.5 million, would that mean that half of those attorneys fees come from one group, the other half from the third party or the other half from consumers or how is that?

MR. STRANGE: That is divided 40 percent to the third-party payors and 60 percent to the consumers because the 28 million is divided 60 percent to the consumers and 40 percent.

THE COURT: So the actual amount that could be reverted to GSK could be approximately 10 or 11 million.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, it could be around that amount.

MR. HEROLD: Your Honor, just tipping the point even sharper. It is really not a reversion. A reversion incurs where if we put aside the third-party payor for a second. On the consumer side, it would be a reversion deal if 16.8 million was actually put in an escrow account. And then the money came out to pay attorneys' fees, administrative costs and claims and the GSK would get what's left.

The way this settlement is structured it is the same way the Hormon settlement was structured. GSK has agreed to pay up to 16.8 million for the consumer side, but it doesn't actually pay it unless --

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1 THE COURT: Unless it is requested. 2 MR. HEROLD: If it is not --THE COURT: If it is not requested then GSK. 3 4 MR. HEROLD: Just doesn't pay it. 5 THE COURT: Just doesn't pay it. 6 MR. HEROLD: Exactly. So this notion of a cy pres 7 would change considerably and require GSK to take money out of 8 its pocket, it doesn't anticipate having to pay unless the 9 amount of consumer claims are much higher than we think it will 10 be, and putting it in some charity. There was some confusion 11 in the papers about that, Your Honor, so I wanted to straighten 12 that out. 13 THE COURT: I wanted it to be clear that there is no cy 14 pres here. The money is in GSK's hands unless X number of 15 claimants claim it and that is where it leaves. 16 MR. HEROLD: Correct, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: For the consumer, because for third-party 18 claimants, they are going to get it. 19 MR. HEROLD: Correct. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Now I am going to hear from the 21 objectors. Let me just see a showing of hands from the 2.2 objectors. What objectors are here for the consumers and which 23 are here for third-party payors.

MR. WEINSTEIN: Your Honor, Jeff Weinstein on behalf of Clay Bain, and he is a consumer.

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MR. WILKINSON: Actually, Your Honor, Wells Wilkinson for PAL. We did raise issues that are relevant to the third-party payors subclass in the settlement. We acknowledge that we do not have standing in that we are not here on behalf of one of those third-party payors, but we do feel that under existing law the Court can certainly consider all our comments. We would like to share them with you even if another party here, a class member, is not present. We would be happy to describe it.

THE COURT: There is nobody here for a third-party payor. Of the other objectors that are in writing, it is all class. Class members.

MR. WEINSTEIN: Consumer class only.

THE COURT: What I would like to do also, I am going to hear from the objectors, but if one objector raises a point I would appreciate it if the next objector, if someone has said that before just say that I join. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. Whatever he says will benefit everyone else. Just say you incorporate any of the other comments and just add anything that is original that hasn't been raised before, and that way we will save everybody time.

So, Counsel, you may proceed.

MR. WEINSTEIN: May it please the Court, Your Honor, I will be brief. As much as I have enjoyed my stay in Puerto Rico, I have a flight to catch.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. WEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. My name is Jeff Weinstein.

THE COURT: I assume that is your luggage there.

MR. WEINSTEIN: That is Mr. Brown's luggage. My luggage is back at the hotel.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. Jeff Weinstein, on behalf of Clay Bain. As I mentioned before, Mr. Brown is our local counsel. Thank you for allowing me to represent pro hac vice. I refer the Court to objections to certification, the settlement the request for attorneys' fees already on file. That is docket at 130. The Court has just hit the nail on the head. To consumers this settlement is illusory because there will not be many consumers that make a claim.

So I would like to discuss my comments solely on the policy reasons why it is in the best interest of consumers that the Court should base the percentage of the fund of the amount of attorneys' fees on the amount actually claimed by class members, not on some hypothetical amount as requested by class counsel.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you one thing, because when you talk, "class members," that's maybe four million dollars in attorneys' fees for class members. Because the other four million are for the third-party payors.

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MR. WEINSTEIN: Your Honor, as I understand it, counsel can probably speak to the numbers more than I. We have a 60/40 split. We have a 60 percent split for consumers.

THE COURT: 60 percent for the consumers. We are talking about the 60 percent for the consumers.

MR. WEINSTEIN: So whatever the amount the Court believes to be a reasonable amount of the attorneys' fees, my request is that the Court wait until after the claim period ends on August 10 to see what the take rate is for consumers.

So I understand the argument that counsel has made about a common fund. I am requesting, as a matter of policy, Your Honor, that what is fair for the class members is that we wait and see, if the Court wouldn't mind, it is not a very long period of time, until August the 10th to see how many actual consumers make claims.

THE COURT: And let me just ask, if anybody has a rough estimate, how many actual consumers have made claims up to now, if somebody knows. If you have an idea.

MR. STRANGE: Your Honor, I think we don't know up to now. I think up until July 1st, there was 115,000 hits to the web site, according to the declaration. And I think, I don't have the exact numbers, but something like requested at that point 10,000 claims sent out, but I am not positive about that.

THE COURT: Okay. And that is not, I assume Ms. Simonet has filed her claim.

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MR. INSERNI: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Please continue.

MR. WEINSTEIN: I am not a mathematician.

THE COURT: Neither am I.

MR. WEINSTEIN: But here we have the defendant, and I am going to go off my script for just a moment, because I believe you raise an important point. Here we have the defendant saying there should be 5,600 claimants, but roughly we have 10,000 people making claims that have signed an affidavit swearing they have potentially perjured themselves, it may not be practical at all for them to have a valid claim. I think the numbers will speak for themselves as they come in. But, remember, claimants are signing under oath swearing that they are telling the truth, under penalty of perjury.

Yet if the numbers bear out, as they have been discussed in this courtroom, it would be impossible for there to be more than 5,600 claims or something to that order.

Again, I am off script. If the take rate is more than two or three percent, Your Honor, of the entire country, I will be surprised.

THE COURT: You could have approximately 10,000 by now. The time they have had, by August 10 it could be up to 20 or 25 at the most. Anywhere between 18,000 and 25, that may be it. And, again, you never know.

MR. WEINSTEIN: I would be very surprised. I would be YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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willing to place a wager at one of the local casinos that the take rate would be substantially less than the numbers have just now been discussed. Probably more or less in the 150 to the 200 range.

As the Court is well aware there is a potential conflict between class counsel and class members in any class action settlement.

The defendant is willing to settle for some amount. Here somewhat illusory because it is not real money. It is claims made. And it has little interest in how that money is divided between counsel and the class. Class counsel, of course, has an interest in maximizing their fees. Nothing wrong with that. We are all trying to make a living. The class has an interest in maximizing the fees so as to maximize their share of the settlement fund, which is obviously in the best interest of claimants.

The problem is that only the class counsel and defendant are at the settlement table. Thus, there is a risk that class counsel would create an artificially high settlement fund with a difficult claims process, signing something under oath, under penalty of perjury to maximize their fees.

For instance, if the defendant were willing to spend 10 million to settle the case there is two options. One would be to create a 10-million-dollar fund, reduced by, say, three million dollars in fees and guarantee that the remaining seven

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million goes to the class members or cy pres. We don't have cy pres here.

Option two would be to create a 20-million-dollar fund less six million dollars in fees, but set up notice and claims process that the parties believe will result in two million dollars in claims. Option two is better for both the defendant who now only pays eight million and the class counsel who doubles their fee.

The class loses under option two because they receive only two million rather than seven million. Since only the defendant and class counsel are at the settlement table there is an incentive to go with option two.

The best way that I would propose, Your Honor, to protect the class, therefore, is to tie the fees to the amount actually received by the class either directly or through a cy pres. That creates an incentive for class counsel to maximize the actual recovery of class members.

In our supplemental objection we cited the Court to the statement of Justice O'Connor respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari in *International Precious Metals Corp. vs. Waters*. That is a case that Mr. Nevares stated several times. I have a different cite because I am using the Supreme Court cite which is 530 U.S. 1223, 2000((... Justice O'Connor cited several reasons for limiting fees to an amount claimed. First, she points out that, setting fees on a

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hypothetical settlement fund amount will "Decouple class counsel's financial incentives from those of the class; increasing the risk that the actual distribution would be misallocated between the attorneys' fees and the plaintiff's recovery."

Second, she points out that using the hypothetical benefits "Potentially undermines the underlying purposes of class actions by providing defendants with a powerful means to enticing class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the class."

Your Honor, the Court here can easily protect the interest of the class by waiting just two or three weeks to see the actual claims made in this case because the deadline is August the 10th. Then the Court will know what actual benefit class counsel obtained for the class. Then, to be fair for everyone involved in this process, the Court certainly will award an attorney -- a reasonable percentage of that amount as attorneys' fees.

Your Honor, in sum, we urge the Court to disapprove this settlement. But if the Court approves the settlement we urge the Court to deny the request for attorneys' fees or to delay the request until the Court has an opportunity to actually see how many folks made claims.

Your Honor, thank you very much.

THE COURT: Let me ask one question. Let's assume I

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wait until the August 10 deadline. There is only 10,000 or let's assume the estimate is even lower. It is 8,000. My question is if Ms. Simonet and, again, this has been -- let's assume this has been just a Puerto Rico class action within Puerto Rico. If this case were to go to trial, even with the local class action, and when I say local, I mean residents of Puerto Rico, I am not just applying Puerto Rico law, but if this case were to go to trial given the Daubert and all the motions, summary judgment discovery, and all the hearings that we would have with certification, going to trial, two or three months, again, this is not just a simple case. Under Loadstar and, again, the fees that I have talked about and, again, in civil rights cases which are much easier than this to try and don't involve Daubert motions or complicated discovery such as this, the fees here could be conceivably, as I stated, anywhere -- it could be in the couple of millions.

So, you know, do you have anything to say about that?

MR. WEINSTEIN: Your Honor, I was told about you to be direct. So I will try to answer your question directly. The fees could be zero because the plaintiffs may not prevail.

THE COURT: That is also true. If they don't prevail.

Again, this is not a 1983 case.

MR. WEINSTEIN: I have some horrible cases in my office that we have taken depositions in. The parties in this case have not taken one deposition yet. I understand that there

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could be tremendous fees. I am not familiar enough with Puerto Rico, Your Honor, to discuss what could potentially happen here. I can tell you in the 5th Circuit this case would already be over because it could not have been approved as a class action settlement, in my opinion, I don't think because it is, the 5th Circuit sits in New Orleans. So we have better comments from class counsel.

If a Loadstar was decided in the 5th Circuit class counsel would be lucky to see a 1, 2 to a 1.5 multiplier on the Loadstar. This is what in my opinion give class actions a bad name. People see notices about the class. They register for the class. Then, for whatever reason, they may or may not get a benefit. But when they get 50 dollars and only 200 people or so make a claim and get 50 dollars and class counsel gets nine million dollars, that destroys the process and it sets a bad precedent for other cases.

All I am asking for the Court to do is, as a matter of fairness and policy, to see how many claims are made to justify, not disputing hard work, Your Honor, but to justify the amount.

THE COURT: Let me say this, what I am going to do is I'll wait until August 10th. That may very well justify that they maintain the settlement as it is.

MR. WEINSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. Clearly within your discretion. The best time to be a federal judge.

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# 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS THE COURT: What jurisdiction are you from? MR. WEINSTEIN: I am from Texas, Your Honor. THE COURT: You are from Texas. Okay. MR. WEINSTEIN: And, by the way, thank you very much. This is the first time I ever practiced law outside the continental United States. It is actually every exciting. Even though I have been practicing law as long as these guys, they are much better preserved than I am. MR. SALAS: It is the warm weather in Puerto Rico. THE COURT: Come more frequently. Mr. Salas has been coming here for a couple of years. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. I know you have to catch a plane. Are you flying to Houston or Dallas? MR. WEINSTEIN: I have a meeting in Washington, D.C. THE COURT: You are taking the Baltimore flight. MR. WEINSTEIN: Would it be okay to be excused now? THE COURT: You are excused and your driver is excused. Very well. Goodbye, Mr. Brown. Okay. Mr. Inserni, are you going to be brief? MR. INSERNI: Very, Your Honor. I am here as local counsel. I was just asked to reiterate what is in writing by attorney Pentz.

THE COURT: And before counsel leaves, what I will do is I am not going to issue a ruling on this. I am going to

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 sleep on it. And I will be issuing a ruling within the next 2 couple of days. I may wait until August 10th. But I am not 3 going to issue it today or tomorrow. I am going to sleep on it 4 and give it careful thought. 5 Thank you. 6 MR. INSERNI: Your Honor, I am just reiterating what's 7 in writing. I have really nothing more to add. I would like 8 to make clear for the record that I have been in practice more 9 or less for the same amount of time as Mr. Nevares and Mr. 10 Salas and I have no doubt whatsoever of their efforts. But I 11 am here representing an attorney. I am here as local counsel. 12 I am here, you know, I submit on his behalf what is in writing. 13 And I really should not add anything else. 14 THE COURT: So you are not adding anything else. 15 MR. INSERNI: Right. And permission to withdraw. 16 THE COURT: Granted. You are excused as well. And you 17 adopt any arguments. 18 MR. INSERNI: That's correct. 19 THE COURT: Madame. 20 MS. BONILLA: Michelle Bonilla Sotomayor. I am also 21 local counsel for William and Kathleen McWhorter and Susan 2.2 Colvin, and we basically rest on our papers and adopt all 23 statements that are not inconsistent with our papers. 24 Okay. Thank you. Last, but not least. THE COURT: 25 MR. WILKINSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Wells Wilkinson YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 from Prescription Access Litigation here on behalf of objector, 2 Diane M. Fox. You haven't asked me if I will be brief, I will 3 try, but I can't promise. I do have a plane to catch myself. 4 Take your time. Where is Ms. Fox from? THE COURT: 5 MR. WILKINSON: Ms. Fox currently lives in Washington 6 state. 7 MR. STRANGE: She lives in Portland, Oregon according 8 to her affidavit. 9 MR. WILKINSON: Portland, Oregon. I am sorry. 10 THE COURT: That is close by. 11 MR. WILKINSON: By way of introduction, I would like to 12 actually just state for the record, the organization that I 13 work for is called Prescription Access Litigation. We are a 14 nonprofit organization that was formed in 2001 to try to bring 15 consumers, unions and senior organizations into the process of 16 using litigation to try to effect change in the prescription 17 drug industry. 18 And, unlike my learned brother, I haven't known any of the attorneys in this case before today. We did object to two 19 of the prior Paxil cases in 2006 and 2008. But we worked with 20 21 different attorneys. Since I wasn't even aware actually that 2.2 the counsel here were the same counsel as were in that case. 23 So our organization is involved in these cases. We primarily 24 bring them or assist the involvement of consumer-oriented

groups to try to bring these cases and to try to maximize the

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benefits and the impact for consumers. So that is our interest.

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You know, we are not -- we don't consider ourselves professional objectors, but we do consider ourselves professionals in this area. And the two prior objections, Counsel Strange mentioned in the two other Paxil cases, the one in 2006 that dealt with consumers, we actually had a number of points that we raised there that were overruled. But some of them were actually adopted by the Court at that time as well.

And then our objection to the Nichols case in Minnesota in 2008 was actually something where we negotiated amendments to the settlement before the date of the final hearing such that we were happy to withdraw our objection.

So there are four or five points that I want to raise today about our concerns about this settlement. So we can start with the notice which we feel has been inadequate generally and is markedly deficient in three specific ways.

Our understanding is, and our experience, is that publication notice is no longer adequate because their means of identifying potential class members in these consumer drug cases.

And we would prefer to see some process to allow direct mail notice or, if possible, even preferred some kind of direct mailing of checks or claims to the members of the class.

THE COURT: Let me ask, how can that be accomplished

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here because here the problem, and I have been within a class for securities litigation. All of a sudden I receive a sevendollar check six years later. But my address is here and that is six years later. We have the HIPAA law here. How can they send the direct notices to everybody? That is one big hurdle.

MR. WILKINSON: It definitely is a hurdle, but it is a hurdle that has been overcome by class counsel in other cases. There are currently two cases that have received preliminary approval and their final approval is pending, but it actually has been supported by their assurances to the Court that they are going to use subpoenas to the large chain pharmacies and also to the large mail order pharmacies to gather the names of consumers and then treat them in a HIPAA-compliant way with a third-party administrator or with the Court to identify who these consumers are. And I believe in both these cases there are proposals to mail them checks or to mail them claims.

So one case is called In Re: Average Wholesale Price Litigation. We cited it in our brief. Another is the First Databank McKesson band litigation going on in the district court in Boston. I believe that is cited in our brief, but I can give you a cite to that as well. There is a way to do this HIPAA compliant.

THE COURT: You say it might be HIPAA compliant, but what about the person who, and there may be many persons who decide, I don't even want to receive a check. I don't want to

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make a claim because I would rather maintain my full HIPAA rights, my right of privacy. And let's assume that the federal judge, I'll make this claim, I am not taking or I have never taken Paxil, not yet. Sometimes I might think about it, but let's assume, for example, that, you know, or maybe I don't want anybody knowing that. I have that right to privacy. Let's assume that somebody else, a reknown attorney, someone who is running for political office who took Paxil within a particular time and no longer suffers from depression or needs — there might be many other. There may be many other examples, but there may be many other persons for 50 or 150 dollars, even if it were higher, would rather not collect any money. That is a concern I have. How do I protect those persons?

Here we are dealing with, this is diversity action here. It is not a federal claim. And we are applying Puerto Rico law. And if we are applying Puerto Rico law, under Puerto Rico law, under the Puerto Rico Constitution there is a right to privacy that goes even beyond the federal constitutional right, the Constitution here is overprotective. And that's a concern I would also have about, you know, these persons, that their rights, you know, as a class or possible class members could be violated by trying to reach other class members. So that is another concern that I have that, perhaps, in another state might not apply.

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Don't blame me. Blame whoever whoever wrote the Constitution. Actually, Congress approved it. But, again, that's one claim. Not a claim, but an issue I would have as to the diversity case.

MR. WILKINSON: I do understand that. And I think there are very important privacy rights in, you know, any litigation around prescription drugs or even around health care services received. And I think that there have to be, you know, very strenuous safeguards that the folks receiving the claims today that are going to be made by individuals. You know, the Court has got to be assured that none of that information will ever get out to anywhere so that, you know, any Congress person or senator or judge or, you know, someone who aspired to one of those positions could file a claim with the claims administrators and know that that information is not going to get out. I think that is very important to make sure we do this proactively because people are volunteering information about drugs they have taken and this is an area where class members face a certain stigma.

THE COURT: But if the list is provided to plaintiffs and defense counsel. Obviously that list of consumers doesn't go to Court. I can't do anything. And they are going to have third parties. Of course I can issue some kind of gag order, but I am going on one side the benefit of getting a possible class of people and names out there vs. the rights of privacy

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of those who don't even want to be put into that class, even though they are potential class members. That is my concern. I have to weigh that.

MR. WILKINSON: No. I do understand that.

THE COURT: Again, that is a right to privacy that probably goes beyond any right to notification. That is the concern I have.

MR. WILKINSON: Sure. I understand that. And the Court has got to weigh, you know, has got to extrapolate and weigh what we think these consumers' interest in terms of their privacy are with their interest in due process and finding out about this claim opportunity.

You know, I feel confident that if counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant were, you know, allowed to see this information, you know, their professional responsibility, you know, code and their practices in that area would safeguard that information quite assuredly. They are certainly privy to a lot of information that, you know, is potentially, you know, damaging and very valuable commercially, et cetera. The only third party I would propose that would see this information would be the claims administrators who are receiving this information from claims coming in as well. So I really propose we expand this to other groups. I would be happy to work with class counsel and, you know, the Court on finding out more information about how this is currently being done to be as

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HIPAA compliant as it needs to be to, you know, have assured several judges that this is a, fair process that does not violate people's HIPAA rights.

I can't speak to the possible preemption issues rising around the constitutional protections here in the associated independent state of Puerto Rico. You know, that, I haven't looked at all. So aside from --

THE COURT: I don't think that there would be that.

HIPAA has that protection, but there is also a right of

privacy. I think both HIPAA and the constitutional right to

privacy goes hand in hand.

MR. WILKINSON: Certainly. I do agree. I do agree, but I feel that even that that is not an avenue that could be explored then perhaps there are other avenues that could be explored and are being explored right now. In the Average Wholesale Price litigation going on the plaintiffs — I'm sorry — the TPP segment of the class were asked when they filed claims for their segment of the fund, they were asked to provide documentation on their consumer's coverage for something like 386 different drugs that were involved in litigation. So they are going to help identify class members using information, you know, that they have. And, again, this was done in a HIPAA-compliant manner as well.

You know, that effort was not explored or, you know, requested from the Court in this particular case, and we find

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Case 3:06-cv-01230-GAG-CVR Document 194-2 Filed 01/29/10 Page 79 of 118 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS that to be unfortunate. THE COURT: Let me ask, the other cases that you have involving the litigation that you mentioned, do they involve personal damages or are they similar to this case? MR. WILKINSON: No. So those two cases actually dealt with gaming of the drug reimbursement system or the drug processing system. In one case it was the manipulation of the drug pricing used by insurers and also sometimes used with cash-purchasing consumers to purchase drugs at pharmacies. That is the First Databank McKesson band litigation. The second was the Wholesale Price Litigation and that was the same set of facts where the prices of certain drugs that were reimbursed under Medicare Part (B) for doctoradministered drugs, those prices were manipulated in order to promote one drug over another. THE COURT: Unless there is a gag order, do you know what the -- actually there isn't, it is a class action settlement, but what were the class action settlements in that case? MR. WILKINSON: The settlement amount in the First Databank case which deals with 386 drugs is 350 million

dollars.

THE COURT: And per person? Per claimant? MR. WILKINSON: Well, I think per claimant it is going to depend on the number and the frequency of the times they

took those 386 drugs.

THE COURT: Okay. So that is a more complicated case.

MR. WILKINSON: It is more complicated. It is more burdensome to subpoen that information from pharmacies because you are dealing with a lot of drugs, et cetera. Here it would be somewhat easier. And the Wholesale Price Litigation, you know, there are several settlements in that case, but one of them deals with 11 drug company defendants. And it is for 125 million dollars. And the third-party payors in both cases, I believe, they received 80 or 82 percent of those amounts and the consumers get the smaller balances.

And we would love to work with the Court and class counsel to try to devise some way to improve the notice that gets out to the consumer class members because we are highly concerned, given the structure of this settlement, that there could be very few consumers filing claims. And, you know, that could lead to, you know, negative policies as described by, you know, objector Weinstein's attorney just a few moments ago, which we completely agree with. There are a couple of aspects that we find --

THE COURT: Isn't this the sort of case that, no matter, let's assume even more money was put in the pot, isn't this the sort of case because the -- no damages, perhaps getting a new pill, if you are getting 50 dollars or 150, you are getting your money's worth and there is no personal damages

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here, at least in this action; no matter what happens, we are still not going to get too many consumers asking for money back.

MR. WILKINSON: Yeah. We hope not. I mean, it is unclear exactly how many consumers were affected by this because there are disputed facts around how many of these pills were in the stream of Paxil's CR. Right? That is disputed, but it seems there could be as many as 14 million consumers that took one of these pills that were split or defective, etc.

One of the aspects of the notice that we found in talking to objector Fox, when we described the notice to her, she, first of all, said that she could not recall if she had taken a pill that was split. And she said when she was taking Paxil she was very depressed. There were times when she could barely make herself take the medicine. And it does go back to between four to seven years ago that she would have to remember this. She said there were times when she was just so depressed she just could not remember that at all.

I think one problem is that the case has been talked about in terms of being related to these split pills. It seems like if a pill splits it would be in two halves, etc. But the release, the release in the settlement is much broader than that. It says the parties are releasing all claims related to defective or adulterated Paxil CR manufactured at the Cidra facility. Therefore, I think it would be more accurate to

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solicit claims from Paxil CR consumers who either took a pill that was split or that they felt was defective. And, in Ms. Fox's case, she felt she took Paxil CR, and it did not help her depression at all. There could be biological reasons for that. Certainly. These drugs don't work the same for every person. Requiring that the pill be split for a consumer to know they can file a claim but releasing a different type of claim makes the notice not as broad as the release that they are giving up. We are worrying about this pool of class action members, what they would be giving up.

There is another deficiency which, Your Honor, I am glad you talked about earlier, about the dates that notices around the right to object were posted, et cetera. And there is one significant problem with the notice. It is stated that for your objection to be considered you have to appear in court today. And, you know, that is not, we feel, a valid rule of law. Newberg on class actions has stated that that is not a viable principle.

THE COURT: Okay. But I stated there were other objectors who were not here. They submitted objections in writing. I mentioned — not in writing, I mentioned here at the beginning of the hearing I am going to consider everybody that is objecting. There is a date for objecting and then there is a date for appearing. If I cure that by saying anything that has been filed, duly filed in writing or

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notified, I am going to consider. I think — and also I would say that almost everything that has been filed over what you are stating or objector Weinstein stated or anybody else and, for all purposes, for anybody who even has an objector or would have liked to object, I can say you have some very good objections and with Mr. Weinstein and everybody else, I will consider those objections, if your objections convince me everybody is going to benefit. And you represent a group, an interest group, which, in a sense, is like a class action within the class action here. It is on the count of the class action for all purposes. The same with Mr. Weinstein. I hope I got his last name right, Weinstein.

MR. WEINSTEIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So, for all purpose, there have been objections. And for all purposes, I am applying these objections to everyone else. And I don't think that your problem -- Mr. Weinstein has some more practical policy objections. You have some due process notice objections, but I will say, for the purposes of the record, I will consider your objections. If you prevail, every other possible claimant will prevail the same as with Mr. Weinstein's arguments or the arguments of other counsel.

MR. WILKINSON: Sure.

THE COURT: I will consider for everybody everything that has been submitted in writing. So I don't think the fact

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that somebody couldn't make it here. Of, course, for 50 dollars I am not going to expect them to pay seven hundred dollars to travel here. The hotels here are more expensive than probably London or Paris.

MR. WILKINSON: I would agree. That would be a concern. But I also think that there is a possible chilling effect that were someone to read this notice and understand that in order to have an objection heard they have to plan to appear. That really is certainly perhaps moot with the consumers because they are not going to plan to come down here for 50 or for a 150-dollar claim to hear the case. But perhaps a small third-party payor who had significant spending on Paxil CR during the class period. They may feel this is a little bit unfair to us because on the TPP claim side the damages are being, you know, approximated based not on their actual spending for Paxil CR tablets that are split or even Paxil CR tablets at all, but just their presence in the marketplace being a TPP as of the date they filed the claim. Right?

THE COURT: But as of today no third-party payor has objected. You have that concern. But if they were but -- I am sure the larger ones are probably going to benefit more. They would probably have objected as well. Nobody has objected.

MR. WILKINSON: You are right. The larger ones are not going to object to this formula. And I think statistically once you are large enough TPP you are not going to have a

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spending that does not reflect on average your size in the market. But a smaller TPP who has 1,000 covered lives or something like that. And there 40,000 TPPs that got direct mail notice of this, the settlement.

A small TPP with 1,000 covered lives is going to be eligible for, I believe, a 47-dollar claim. And they could have one prescription that they filled for Paxil and that they covered the cost of; and that's going to eat up, you know, any benefit they would have.

So they might have an argument that the damages should be calculated either based on the approximation or on data that we submit showing what our actual Paxil CR purchases during the class period were. Because when they are small, the disparity between those two could be much greater.

And because, you know, small TPPs might have read this notice and understood that my objections aren't going to be heard unless I go there. I am not going to bother to do it.

That is a problem. This same provision was actually in the --

THE COURT: But at the same time this might be devil's advocate, but you might have a small TPP, but you could have several small TPP's that could retain somebody in a group like yours to represent all of them. They are not here. But you are here.

MR. WILKINSON: I know I am here. But they may have read. They rely on class counsel to apprise them of their

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rights and their obligations in the notice. And class counsel failed, clearly failed to do that by including a provision which they now recant they are now going to ask you to consider all objections whether people are here or not. I agree with that ultimate conclusion, but I think there is a chilling effect that I think is very bad policy. And this very same provision appeared in the 2008 pediatric Paxil with third-party payors. And we objected to it then and the Court struck it.

I think it is bad policy, and it was the dereliction of class counsel's duty to include that in this particular case. They should know better. I hate to criticize attorneys because my organization is based upon the premise that we want to get these class actions filed by private attorneys to benefit consumers and small third-party payors. So I hate to stand here and have to do this. But the facts of this case are that glaring that I have to make that point.

And I think there is a difference -- you could possibly argue that we can't just send claims out to Paxil CR consumers, individual consumers, because we want to show that they actually can prove that they were harmed, that they paid for a pill that was broken or split. But we aren't requiring that of the TPPs. We are not requiring they showed they spent any money on Paxil CR. And their ability to keep records and to show they actually had spending during this class period, four to seven years ago, is much higher than the average consumer's.

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Our consumer, that we found, couldn't obtain her records going back more than three years from two of the nationwide major pharmacies, CVS and RiteAid.

So the burden on her to find documentation for this, you know, I think it is unfair because it is not the same burden that is placed on the more busy savvy and sophisticated third-party payors of the class.

So, moving on from, you know, the notice itself, I think the inadequacy of the notice, i.e. the failure of innovative and more directed methods to let consumers know that this opportunity exists is, you know, goes to our complaint about the reversion to GSK. There is an incentive in this litigation that the fewer claims by the consumers the more money reverts to GSK. We find that that is very problematic.

The best way to solve this without scuttling the entire settlement, and we don't want to see that happen, is to require some kind of additional supplemental efforts to provide notice to the consumers. So one possible option would be to allow the claims window to be expanded. There is one case that involved GSK. I forget which one it was, but in that case there is a reversionary amount of funds that were left for one year for any parties who wished to file claims.

And I think that would not be unreasonable in this case because the defendant is gaining a release which, we think, is perhaps overbroad. They are gaining a release of all those

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claims. So why not allow a much broader window to allow these claims to come in? I think that would be beneficial.

On the last point of the attorneys' fees, again, we hate to criticize attorneys' fees because we know this is a vital public role these class actions play, and we support them; and, you know, we actively get groups involved in these cases. But in this particular case there is a potential that the benefit to the class, to the consumer segment, is very illusory as counsel Weinstein said a moment ago; and we completely support all his concerns in that regard.

I also would just like to point out that I don't think that this case is going to be decided based on case law and precedent. You have an awful lot of jurisdiction discretion, Your Honor, to make this decision about attorneys' fees. But some of the cases that have been cited like Waters vs.

International Metal, that was a very different case and could be distinguished in that the common fund in that case was actually — the size of the fund was related to how much each class member obtained. The class members' claims were proportional to a percentage of the common fund. So, in that case, the bigger the fund the more claimants got. If they didn't participate in the claims process, you know, at least the rest of the claims made by class members who did, received a benefit.

And then in the *Master's vs. Wilhelmina* case and I

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believe it was also called Williams vs. MGM. In that case there was no reversion to the defendant. The money was actually — the decision for the Court was to use the money for increased claims to the existing, increasing the amount of money given to the existing claimants or a cy pres award. So, you know, in this case there was a reversion. And I think that really undermines the potential justification for attorneys' fees.

And I would, you know, strenuously support counsel Weinstein's suggestion that you continue this fairness hearing to some date after August 10th. Not only so that we could evaluate and perhaps brief the issue of whether the attorneys' fees should be awarded based on looking at the actual claims that were filed, but we should also look at whether there should be supplemental notice efforts to try to increase the number of claims filed, because that is the only way to prevent all these claims from being released. Right? Which it's going to happen on August 10th. So the only way to prevent, you know, that injustice to the consumer class is to try to explore supplemental notice efforts.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question, what if the Court disagrees with the attorneys fees, rather than 8.5 says 4.0 or 5.0. Would that change your argument? It seemed to me, you know, not only from you, but from other counsel, from Mr. Weinstein objecting to the attorneys' fees; fees that the

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main objection is that, it seems to me that, let's assume that very few persons make these claims, it's a windfall for these attorneys who are making somewhat of a fortune, whereas the actual claimants did not claim that much.

The other group of plaintiffs does get the money. But....

MR. WILKINSON: You know, on that point the request of 28 percent of the 11.2 million dollars that are allocated for the third-party payors, I think that that fee request is very reasonable. Class counsel has constructed a very creative way to provide all of the money in the fund going out to parties who are affected or potentially affected, and I applaud that. I think that is actually a good thing. I would like to see that same kind of mathematics and reasoning applied to the consumers.

If it is not, the third-party payor allocation of attorney's funds, I believe that is 3.1 million dollars. On the consumers' side, that is 16.8 million dollars, I would like to see the amount of attorneys' fees that are awarded to class counsel linked to how well they did not only in creating the fund that exists, but also creating a notice program that lets consumers know. You know, so this would mean that, you know, they would be advocates for supplemental notice come a continued hearing in mid August or so if their fees were linked to that. I think that would be very beneficial to the class

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and it would eliminate the potential appearance of conflict of interest in this case.

I would hate to see something like one million dollars go out to 20,000 claims that are filed. Your Honor, our experience with these cases is that three, four, maybe five percent of consumers who are eligible ever file a claim.

Right? So the numbers could be that low easily. And so if one million dollars goes out.

THE COURT: Also let's assume they were to send supplemental notices in the mail and we go around the HIPAA issue, and I'm talking from personal experience, but I assume I speak for most of us. When you get notices like this in the mail that says you may be eligible for 100 dollars or 150 dollars most of us just throw them out. Do you have any statistics overall on these types of claims and what the actual number of claimants is? Even if we give the notice as you would like it to be provided, does it go higher or does it stay there?

I have received things. And it hasn't been HIPAA related, but I don't -- small amounts of shares for X, Y, and Z companies and I never, it is like when I get the proxies. It is like vote for the board of directors. And 99 percent of the time I throw them out except one company that I like. That is my other concern. And the other thing I do have a concern, let's assume Mr. Nevares had litigated this case only as to

Ms. Simonet and prevailed.

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Again, had he prevailed under the Puerto Rico law perhaps she would have gotten a very small amount and perhaps under Puerto Rico law he might not be entitled automatically to attorneys' fees. But it would have opened up and gone through the whole exercise of opening up a very dangerous precedent for GlaxoSmithKline. It is public and then he is going to have expert testimony.

And it is going to be public and then comes a second lawsuit and a third lawsuit, and that is what GSK wants to avoid. If they were to litigate, even if it weren't a class action, if they were litigating separately different claims by -- let's assume it is not a class action. But cases, sometimes here in this Court we have them and we have 200 claimants and they all get consolidated. For all purposes, I have 200 plaintiffs here, but they are all litigated. would run up, you know, it could be 10 or 15 different attorneys litigating. Those attorneys' fees could go higher than eight million if they have to litigate that here. They get filed at different times. I may end up with some cases. If I don't consolidate the cases and some get filed later it could go to a different judge. It is different statute of limitations required as to each plaintiff. When did each plaintiff receive notice or find out that he had a possible claim. So, you know, we could have minors who don't -- who

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here in Puerto Rico, if you are a minor and let's assume someone who was taking Paxil was 12 years old. That case could get filed, nine years from now. And, in a sense, by doing the class action they are avoiding all those suits which, you know, Mr. Nevares could bring. And he has had, for example, political discrimination cases. He has brought 10 separate cases. And let's assume that he prevailed in eight of those cases. He got attorneys' fees and all. And maybe that's from GSK's perspective they are trying to avoid that multiplicity and litigation.

I don't know if you have anything to add.

MR. WILKINSON: Sure. So there class counsel's fees through this settlement might end up being less than what they might be awarded if they were to bring these claims individually under a consumer protection statute, if there is one here in Puerto Rico.

THE COURT: Also for GSK, by settling this, even though they may be paying individual counsels a bit more than if this were just one or two plaintiffs, but they are avoiding having to do that multiple time. So for them it is a windfall because they are paying a lot of money, but by avoiding what they could be paying. In the United States there could be other cases.

MR. WILKINSON: Sure. I agree that the awards for attorneys could be greater if they try these cases individually. And if they were --

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THE COURT: GSK attorneys are also saving their client a lot of money. If they litigated 300 cases nationwide they will make a lot of money, but their client is going to lose a lot of money. And the way I look at it, and I acknowledge everything that you stated to the Court, as has prior counsel, but isn't this, I am keeping in mind, the consumers are there, I am not forgetting about the consumers, but isn't this sort of — this is the sort of case where any individual consumer, at least based on my ruling here in Puerto Rico law, is not going to make money. Nobody is going to bring these cases. And you know, it will probably end up — they are not going to end up in small claims court. You have to prove so much. Just proving one single case is going to cost too much money. The only incentive for plaintiffs to bring this is to bring this through a class action.

And, again, for the defense, on the other side, from a business perspective they are going to settle in a class action because otherwise they are just going to have too much — they could have several individual claims. And that is the problem in this case because if we were talking about personal injury or more significant claims, then a lot of, you know, and settlement from the consumer's perspective or from the victim's perspective that, perhaps, weighs more. But this is the sort of litigation that, perhaps, you know, the consumers and everybody else have probably equal weights. And that's my

concern. If it wasn't for plaintiffs' counsel here, this
lawsuit, you know, it is very hard to find people to bring it.

MR. WILKINSON: Sure. I agree.

THE COURT: Not only here, but any other state for any other class action.

MR. WILKINSON: There are cases that we know that we have been approached by attorneys who identified some, you know, unfair deceptive practice within the prescription drug industry and process and they identified the practice to us. So they made sure that these cases were brought. The class counsel play a vital role in this. We support the class action litigation cases to bring these cases that would not be brought otherwise.

But the caveat is the class counsel, once they are put in this case are put in the difficult position, as counsel Weinstein described earlier, that they have the potential to receive attorneys' fees that are significant. And the defendant wants to get peace from the case, the general release that will make it go away nationwide. But it is the consumers that we are most concerned about. And the judge in these cases has to play a heightened role scrutinizing what the terms of the settlement are because the judge acts as a fiduciary on behalf of all the absent class members.

It is different than, you know, the normal litigation where the two parties are before the Court.

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THE COURT: What if I play the more active role and I say, no, no, I am not going to approve this. And eight million go to cy pres. And I wait until August 10 and there is eight million they will have to hand out. The cy pres money also is never going to go to consumers anyway.

MR. WILKINSON: Right. So I would support cy pres as an alternative way to try to benefit consumers who are harmed by whatever practice was alleged. And an alternative benefit received in exchange for their release. Right? So cy pres award, in many cases, can be appropriate especially in many cases like this where it may be hard to identify which consumers took a split pill, especially in cases where the nature of the class members themselves makes it harder for them to self-identify and say, "Yes, I did take a split pill."

I mean, split pills are not uncommon. People split their own pills regularly. So if you open a bottle of Paxil CR and find that pills are broken or split you are not going to know that these pills are not going to work. Class members are not going to know at that moment that they have been harmed. They have paid for something that was defective. In this particular case a cy pres award might be the most warranted because it is hard for the class members to come forward.

THE COURT: Okay. But that cy pres award, those class members would never see a cent of that cy pres award.

MR. WILKINSON: They wouldn't. But there would be YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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benefits to -- there can be benefits through public education and advocacy, teaching consumers about, you know, the risks of taking pills that are defective. What to look for when you open your prescriptions if the pills are broken, how to read and understand labels to know that a controlled release drug means that the integrity of the pill itself is relevant.

THE COURT: Isn't that something, for example, at least GSK, I am sure, and again, I am not putting words in their mouth, but, I am sure that from this experience they are going to take a big look at labeling to avoid future cases like that. Isn't that something that, you know, because, obviously, if they don't do this, and let's assume that for Paxil, for any other drug, I am sure for all those labels, and when they advertise drugs to doctors, they can perhaps insure they are going to have a bit more of an aggressive campaign. Don't take the split pill. Bring it back or take it to the doctor. You know, they can do that outside of the settlement. And I am sure they are probably going to do it because they don't want, obviously, this case is going to get settled hopefully.

The public is going to know about it and then every time there is another split drug they are going to sue them again and bring a class action.

So can't the industry itself take those precautionary measures?

MR. WILKINSON: Well, you know, with all due respect to YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

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my brothers here on behalf of GSK, I don't think the industry takes those proactive steps even after litigation has happened. And I think in this particular case, this case is flying over the radar. Most consumers don't know about this case. We talked to something like 20 people who are consumers who signed up through our web site or other means and who had taken Paxil and none of them had heard about this settlement at all. And none of them had taken Paxil CR. Half of them knew they hadn't taken Paxil CR. The other half of them were not sure whether it was Paxil or Paxil CR that they took.

So consumers have not been educated about what to look for just by the presence of the litigation here. And they certainly haven't been educated about the opportunity to file a claim. So we feel that those things would warrant a cy pres award as an alternative. Unfortunately, the Court is faced with a decision with this settlement of --

THE COURT: What about the persons who have filed claims by now, who have been diligent and perhaps represent that 80 percent of the people who read. You know, and I don't think there is no way of knowing perhaps the persons you communicated to, that particular group doesn't read. Again, I don't know.

And, again, for example, I haven't seen any. Of course, I approved this. I know about it, but I haven't read anything or perhaps seen anything in the paper where, you know,

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maybe I read or maybe I have seen something about Paxil. But I am not taking Paxil because I do see those ads, not for this case, but I do see them on TV or radio or cable or local TV.

You open up the newspaper and there is a big article. I know I am not taking that. And I have seen them for different multiple drugs. I think it is not Viagra. It is the other company. There have been some recalls recently. You see the publicity when you look at the magazines or the ads on TV, please call blah, blah, blah.

MR. WILKINSON: I agree. Just that, you know, just seeing one of these ads sometimes is not enough to spur a consumer to act. I think as the affidavit submitted by Ms. Cancelo, the agent hired to do the notice program, I think her statistics estimate that something like 80 percent of the class members have seen — are calculated to have seen one of these ads twice.

THE COURT: In this case.

MR. WILKINSON: In this case, right.

THE COURT: In this case this is consonant with counsel's estimate.

MR. WILKINSON: I think it was based on her affidavit. I think their estimate was based on that affidavit. You know, just seeing one of these ads two times does not necessarily let you know, you know, this is about you. This is something you can participate in. People see. Information overload happens

when people sees these things all the time.

THE COURT: You don't have somebody who submitted like an affidavit or an expert to tell the Court that. You only see it twice or three times.

MR. WILKINSON: I don't have that expert. I don't have that evidence. The only evidence is the one consumer we spoke to who has not heard the evidence at all. She is an educated person, a Ph.D., a sociology professor, very interested, and concerned, but had not known about the settlement at all. That is the problem with these traditional al forms of a publication notice. It doesn't reach people.

THE COURT: Let's assume that everything she says is 100 percent truthful, but I would be weighing her representations versus at least, you know, eight to ten thousand persons who already filed claims: And I assume, you know, we have persons in New York, Florida, Texas, Montana, Idaho, Guam, you know Oregon, at least we have one in Puerto Rico.

MR. WILKINSON: On August 11 we are going to be faced with a decision of what to do about -- let's say, 10,000 claims are filed. That is going to turn into a half a million dollars worth of claims sent out if they are all in the 50-dollar range. Then the Court has got to, you know, got to decide what is fair to the absent members of the class. Is it better to do some kind of supplemental notice in exchange for the claims

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS that are going to be released. Is it fairer to extend the 1 2 claims deadline period to a large enough window to let people 3 find out about the settlement and participate? Or should the 4 settlement just be rejected? There are not enough consumers 5 releasing their claims participating to make this release worth 6 while. That puts the consumers back in the boat, the failure 7 of the litigation by class counsel. It is not like they got 8 nothing. Their fate is to litigate the class action forward. 9 Right? I don't support -- this one case is --10 THE COURT: This case has already been certified as a 11 class. Am I correct? 12 MR. WILKINSON: Your Honor, I was not aware that was 13 true actually. But my involvement in this case started, you 14 know, three days before the objection deadline when we first 15 found out about the case. THE COURT: The problem is even though there being a 16 17 class nobody opted out of the class. 18 MR. WILKINSON: Okay. I thought this was a settlement class where it was certified for purposes of settlement and the 19 20 first notice about the case went out with the claims. 21 THE COURT: You are correct and, Counsel, not that the class was certified and then there was a settlement. You are 2.2 23 correct. 24 MR. WILKINSON: Okay. All right. You know, consumers,

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why are they going to opt out? My concern -- my concern is not

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the consumers --

THE COURT: Then I approved the class and Mr. Nevares litigates the case. I am also sure if there are going to be objectors to the class we would have, perhaps, you and counsel Weinstein and the two other counsel and that's — again, I have had class actions. I have had at least one big class action that was settled for 77 million dollars; and that involved 1st Bank. It involved shares of stock that were advertised or sold and allegedly weren't worth what they were sold for.

Once the 12(B)(6) was denied, as is in this case, the case got settled. In that case I think there was only one objector. Again, that was a case where every individual person — and that is a case where you have names and it is easier for everybody to get the money. In that case there was only one objector. Nobody showed up. And I have another class action I am working on. And that's my — at least, from my experience, not too many people object to these things.

Going back, I don't think Mr. Nevares was involved in that case, it was a Rico antitrust case here involving Volvo 15 years ago. I think the final settlement, Mr. Barrios was involved in that case. I think that case — it is no secret — what everybody got at the end was a fifty-dollar certificate or.

MR. BARRIOS: It was overturned on appeal, Your Honor. They got nothing.

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early on. I remember the settlement that was approved at some point was like 50 dollars. And I think that case got litigated. It was a class action. What happened was there was no settlement. But it was a class action, but it was like 50 dollars what everybody got. Some people did get the certificate and probably used it before the appeal. But it was like 50 dollars. Am I correct, Mr. Barrios, something like that?

MR. BARRETO: I don't remember Your Honor.

THE COURT: That was a case that was not very high that actually got litigated.

MR. WILKINSON: I have seen cases where, cases like that where you can actually mail notice to every class member and they have the opportunity to choose to opt out or not. And my concern here is that the notice was not disseminated broadly enough so a lot of people don't know and they didn't choose to opt out. The decision to opt out were erroneous so they thought they had to come down here to the beautiful associated independent state of Puerto Rico to opt out — to object — not to opt out, but to object. So I think the reaction of the class is not a good indicator of the support of the settlement. But, personally, but I am really most concerned about the absent class members who haven't heard about it at all who are being asked to release claims.

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And I think, rather than scuttle the settlement and provide nothing to consumers and third-party payors I would like to see the Court require supplemental notice that explores different ways that are HIPAA compliant to identify consumers who might be able to participate.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask one final question.

Wouldn't you judge this case, if you were in my position,

differently from a case of Paxil which caused personal injury

versus a case there is no personal injury. Personal injury is

not a claim. Isn't it different? Because I think in the

personal injury case, if this were the scenario, I would give

much more notice because I would be settling this case for

persons who conceivably would be injured.

And it is very hard. And perhaps the class would be different because, but, again, this is just a specific class of persons who have taken the split Paxil and they didn't get their monies worth for that pill. Because I believe that -- I lost the opinion, but I believe there were some other claims here that got dismissed that GSK prevailed. But what is left is the broken -- this is not a case, even though it is important for consumers, I don't think this is a case that, again, these are not pills. There is no allegation here in the settlement that this caused cancer or somebody became impotent or had birth defects. That would be, in my opinion, a very different scenario. And, probably, you know, under these terms

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I wouldn't be settling that. The notice would have to be much different. This is a different case. It probably only involves 50 dollars. It could be more, 150. Most people aren't going to go through the trouble to fill out the paperwork. Most people see under, "Penalty of perjury," I have to sign this. You know, and again, 10,000 -- if we get 15,000 or 20, that is a big number.

MR. WILKINSON: The reticence of consumers to know they were harmed, right, or even if they know they were harmed financially by buying a product that didn't work, right, they are going to be able to understand that or their reticence to, even if they do see a notice to the class, by filing a claim, both of those are proactive to send the consumers who we can best identify, a claim, because they are giving up, they are releasing these claims. So they should get something in return.

THE COURT: Let me say something else, because if this case is settled through the class action and over your objections and Mr. Weinstein's objections, this settlement does not preclude anybody who would conceivably have any personal —let's assume somebody through this because of a split pill had some personal injury here in this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction from bringing that claim because that has not been settled here. What has been settled here are the claims that survived and the plaintiffs that was here.

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But if a new plaintiff comes in and there is no statute of limitations they can raise, you know, that's not precluded by the settlement.

MR. WILKINSON: Right. So this settlement is only about economic damages. I agree.

THE COURT: I issued a -- you know, I have an opinion denying the motion to dismiss. But because it's been settled, for all purposes it's, you know, obviously that might apply to the plaintiffs in this case. But it doesn't apply to, and I think counsel, you agree with me, this doesn't apply to other claims and other plaintiffs.

MR. WILKINSON: That's correct. I think other claims face a statute of limitations problem. But, Your Honor, again that is not a matter before the Court.

THE COURT: Let me say this, this is not one of these cases where it is an MDL case where we would conceivably have because we have some other MDL cases. If this were a multi district litigation case perhaps we would have a Paxil claim in California, one in Minnesota, New York, southern district, eastern northern district, Florida district and Texas, we probably wouldn't be here. We have the California claim and we have the Puerto Rico. So it is probably not too many attorneys even interested in bringing in these claims as a class action.

MR. WILKINSON: Right. I understand that that is how this case started, but the release is nationwide. It affects

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the consumer we found in Portland, Oregon. It affects any other consumers that we don't find and the claims process does not find. And I am most concerned about the absent class members receiving adequate notice and that is — so they can participate in the settlement.

My subsidiary concern is that the structure of the settlement, you know, is out there on record such that the attorneys' fees are not linked to what we feel is their, you know, aligning their interests with that of the consumer class. I think that is very troubling to us to see this settlement structured in the way it is.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much and I appreciate it.

You are welcome to stay. I know you have to catch a plane, if you need to leave. Thank you very much. And, again, I will issue my ruling at some point. Just to let you know, thank you very much. And even if I don't agree with you in this case, again, I am going to think about it. But you have illuminated the Court because I do get a lot of class actions, but you may not prevail here, but in the long run you have been very informative. It may help in other cases, if not indirectly.

So thank you very much. And you are always welcome here to object in any other case.

Okay. Some minor questions of counsel. Let me just YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR

#### 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 1 ask both sides, because, again, I haven't approved the final 2 settlement. Let's assume I feel comfortable with the 3 settlement and this is a hypothetical. I am not saying I 4 don't. But let's assume I am saying I don't feel comfortable 5 with the 8.5 million. I would feel comfortable approving the 6 whole settlement but with attorneys receiving let's say 6.5 7 rather than 8.5. What would be the parties' contention? Would 8 you go through with the settlement or is it an all or nothing 9 settlement? 10 MR. STRANGE: Your Honor, you have the discretion to 11 approve whatever attorneys' fees you think are appropriate. If 12 you approve the settlement the settlement is approved. 13 Whatever fee you approve we will take it. 14 THE COURT: So you submit it to me for approval subject to any modifications. 15 MR. STRANGE: With respect to the attorneys' fees. Not 16 17 with respect to the settlement. 18 THE COURT: It is important because it is important 19 that if I do approve the 8.5 or I reduce it somewhat a bit, but it is important that I will obviously let it be known in the 20 21 opinion that it is because the Court has decided that that's 2.2 what is approved and not that it is the parties and the Court 23 is rubber-stamping it. 24 MR. STRANGE: Yes, your Honor. 25 MR. HEROLD: Your Honor, if I may address that.

# 06CV1230 - ALMA SIMONET, ET AL., v. GLAXOSMITHKLINE - FAIRNESS 109 agree with what Mr. Strange has said, and would direct the Court specifically to paragraph 20 of the settlement agreement, which lays out whether or not either party can terminate the

settlement based on what the Court does. And essentially what it says is that if the Court changes a material provision of the settlement agreement itself then either party would have the right to terminate. But if the Court awards attorneys'

fees in whatever amount, that is not a ground for termination.

9 But GSK has no position.

THE COURT: Mr. Nevares seems he wants to settle for the one dollar.

MR. HEROLD: I am not suggesting that.

THE COURT: I will seriously look into that. For example, the cy pres issue, that will allow the parties to withdraw from the agreement.

MR. HEROLD: Correct.

THE COURT: I don't have any other questions. If there is anything briefly that anyone wants to bring up.

Let me say this, I am very inclined, for the reasons I have stated, to approve the agreement as it is. I am going to sit a little bit more on the attorneys' fees. I think you are all, in what I stated, you are very entitled to attorneys' fees. And I did my Loadstar analysis. It does benefit you. And I think this case — this case, if it had been litigated it would have taken — it probably would have earned counsel

attorneys fees. So I think the attorneys' fees are necessary for this type of litigation to move on and be settled. And so, again, if there is any reduction, percentage-wise I don't think it is going to be significant. There may not be any reduction. Again, I want to sleep on it. I just want to let you know that I am very inclined to, as I stated earlier, to approve the agreement.

This does not involve personal injury. It only involves the split pills. And it is a just consumer claim.

From my experience with the other litigation, the 1st Bank litigation, nobody objected.

So, and okay.

Mr. Strange?

MR. STRANGE: Thank you, Your Honor. I will keep it brief in light of your comments, but I did want to make the point with respect to the PAL objections in that I think counsel misspoke. They didn't object in Nichols. Nichols is a reported decision against GSK that I cited to the Court where the Court in approving that settlement held that you don't have to consider the amount claimed. It is on the total fund. But, PAL did object to the Hormon settlement, which was a settlement I was involved in in Illinois that was a claims-made fund just like this, no reversion just like this; and we have attached for the Court as an exhibit to our response to the objections Exhibit A, a copy of PAL's objections. And they are identical

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to the ones they made here. They made an argument that you have to do it on the amount claimed; and that the Court should delay the approval until you find out how much is claimed. And there should be a cy pres.

In overruling those objections the court in *Hormon* and we recorded it on page 57 of our response to the objections made an important point which is that if the case proceeded to trial and there was a verdict, the defendant would still be entitled to a reversion of the funds depending on how much people claimed. And citing the *Boeing* case. That is the main point. That is why the judge in *Hormon* overruled that objection. And that is why the Courts continually overrule that objection.

And with respect to the issue of whether the fee should be based on the amount of claims or the fund made available, the reason that the defendant or that the objectors talk about a policy reason is because the law is to the contrary.

And that's in the Waters case that Mr. Nevares already cited to Your Honor. And that case held "no case is held that a district court must consider only the actual payout determining attorneys' fees." And that court cited to the William's case where the 9th Circuit said a district court abuses discretion by basing the fee on the class members' claims against the fund rather than the percentage of the fund. Because in these types of cases, Your Honor, as Your Honor

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knows from the Loadstar, they are very difficult to pursue against a very established defendant who hires very capable counsel. And that's why, with all the work we have done --

THE COURT: And local counsel.

MR. HEROLD: That is what he meant, Your Honor.

MR. STRANGE: That is what I meant. We have worked on this case for five years. We have thousands of hours. Just our Loadstar alone is 4.2 million. And so to get them to put up this size of a fund --

THE COURT: When you say, "4.2," you mean 4.2 for Puerto Rico or you include California.

MR. STRANGE: All of the California cases. All the lawyers on the plaintiffs' side.

THE COURT: By settling this, the California case is being settled as well. This not only takes care of Puerto Rico, but it is taking care of that California case, which is more advanced than Puerto Rico. In a sense, when I made my calculation of the Loadstar, even if it goes down to three million, you still have to consider the California case, which could add up to what you actually requested in attorneys' fees.

MR. STRANGE: Yes, Your Honor. Actually, I think the volume of pleadings in that case right now is taller than Your Honor because we've gone through two class certifications motions we filed and all the numerous 11 motions to dismiss just in that case alone.

So I do appreciate the time, Your Honor, and we have, I think, put together a settlement that has a substantial benefit to the class and I appreciate it.

MR. HEROLD: Okay. Your Honor, I have just a few very quick comments. First, is that we discovered that the order that was submitted to Your Honor, the final approval order was out of date so we prepared a new one. It reflects all the objections and a few other things.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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And secondly, just to comment very quickly, I notice that my friend from PAL mentioned that the -- what he called the traditional forms of notice are something that PAL doesn't like or wants to add to. And there is a reason that the traditional forms of notice, which are the forms used in this case are often used. And you've touched on most of them for this case. That is, if you require subpoenas to find private information about people taking antidepressants that creates a whole new set of issues. And he cited to two cases, both of which I am unfamiliar with, the AWP case and another case in Boston. Both the same judge. He didn't have any antidepressants involved, at least to my knowledge, Your Honor, in those cases.

There is also the expense, Your Honor. I liken this to the traditional form. This case is sort of a Cadillac of notice. It is a good solid traditional notice program. He is

asking for what I call the Ferrari of notice. It is very expensive and it is dangerous because it sets a precedent.

THE COURT: And I think that notice, if this involved personal injury or any other type of injury or possible harm to a fetus or something like that, in the '60's litigation, you might need a Ferrari. You might need a Lotus. You might need a Lamborghini notice. But, again, based on my experience and that 1st Bank litigation and class action settlement, it is not that many people actually.

MR. HEROLD: Right. And we think this notice is well, well within the realm of the types that are traditionally approved. I just wanted to make that point.

THE COURT: Mr. Nevares.

MR. NEVARES: Mr. Salas.

MR. SALAS: Just a couple of things. I listened to Mr. Wilkinson's statements and I almost felt like, you know, I could go and have a glass of wine with him and talk about those things. But it was important, despite everything that he said to the Court. He really didn't bring any proof to the Court and this is a Court of proof.

THE COURT: I know we only have that person from Oregon. It is at least 10,000 thousand, maybe let's lower it that to 8,000 persons. So I note that.

MR. SALAS: On the HIPAA that he was suggesting, despite the fact that it is illegal in the HIPAA for anybody,

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even a requester of any kind to obtain that kind of information that he wanted us to obtain, he said that his own client could not obtain records from the drugstore that were more than three years old. So even if you were to order anybody to try to get that information, by his own client's own experience, those records are not available because the class period here ended in 2005.

So it was totally what he was he was talking about were dreams, really, the way I felt. Your Honor, the way — the only other thing that I wanted to say was that with respect to the amount of attorneys' fees in the Waters case which, of course, the Supreme Court denied a writ. That was an award of 33 percent on a reversionary fund on 40 million. The Court specifically addressing the issue said in Boeing vs. Van Gambert the Supreme Court settled this question by ruling "that class counsel are entitled to a reasonable fee based on the funds potentially available to be claimed regardless of the amount actually claimed." That is a direct quote in the Waters case. So the law says that what really the amount that you need to consider is the settlement fund that we have created.

Now, having said that, the district court has great latitude in giving the award as long as you explain your reasoning. And if you explain your reasoning the latitude that you are given by the law will not be disturbed by a court on appeal.

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So what I am telling the Court is based on the law, based on everything that you have heard here today and the statements that the Court has made during this hearing, you have great latitude to give an award that is justifiable, Judge and I think the amount of attorneys' fees that we have requested is what the law entitles us to get. It really reflects the amount of work that we have put into this case; the risks that we have taken over the past five years in as much as even we, Mr. Nevares and myself and other counsel, we have given up a lot of other case. We have passed up a lot of other opportunities to dedicate ourselves to this case. We have put money out of our own pocket to the risk in this venture. It is not that we ran around making money not doing any work.

I would just say all these attorneys who came here to object, where were these guys for the past five years? Why did they not help us? Why did they not come and help the class if they are really interested in the class? Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further?

MR. WILKINSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused.

What I will do, obviously I have to make some written findings. I don't think anybody is requesting a transcript at

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1	this time.
2	Okay. Right?
3	MR. NEVARES: No.
4	THE COURT: I will use the rough draft for my own
5	internal purposes.
6	Thank you very much.
7	MR. NEVARES: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	(Whereupon Court was adjourned)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, YVETTE RICHARDSON, Official Court Reporter in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, and a Registered Professional Reporter certified by the National Court Reporter's Association, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the within entitled and numbered cause on the date hereinbefore set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared under my direction.

Whereunto I have set my hand this 28th day of January 2010.

17 S/YVETTE RICHARDSON, CSR, RPR, CCR
Official Court Reporter

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